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Introduction
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) shocked the world when it entered the world stage in 2014. Having seized 
very large territories in Syria and Iraq, its expansion within the Middle East seemed unrestrainable by the end 
of 2014. The Iraqi Army’s initial effort to halt ISIS failed catastrophically, with soldiers fleeing their positions; 
and in Syria the various actors were caught up in a bloody civil war.
With US air support, the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds were the main force acting as boots on the ground and 
 managed to halt the ISIS advance at the Syrian town of Kobane,1 which became a turning point for ISIS 
 expansion. Simultaneously in Iraq, Kurdish Peshmerga forces stopped the ISIS advance only 50 kilometers 
from the Kurdish Regional Government’s (KRG) capital Erbil. Halting ISIS advances in both countries was a 
significant achievement for the Iraqi and Syrian Kurds, something which no other Syrian oppositional groups 
nor the Iraqi Army had been able to accomplish.
The Kurdish success against ISIS quickly won them acclaim from the West (especially the US and European 
countries) and rendered them the key ally in the continued US-led effort against ISIS. Iraqi and Syrian Kurds 
have since then won significant victories in their fight against ISIS. In Iraq, Kurdish groups have regained 
95% of the Iraqi Kurdish territory initially lost, and in Syria, the Kurdish militia of Yekîneyên Parastina Gel 
(YPG) has led fighting to retake territories near the Syrian borders to Turkey and Iraq (Kurdistan Regional 
 Government, 2015).
In Western media, the Kurds are often praised for their fight for human rights, gender equality, secular rule, 
and democracy, which is in sharp contrast to the horrific rule of ISIS (Watson & Tuysuz, 2014). An example is 
the Syrian Kurdish female fighters, frequently portrayed in newspapers’ reporting on the conflict. The  narrative 
often frames the Kurdish groups as a homogeneous entity with a democratic baseline that aspires to Western 
values. Furthermore, the Kurdish people are also described as a united populous that has been denied their 
basic political rights and suffered substantial abuses from the states in the region. One example of this is a 
 general description from the BBC in 2016. The historical dimension in the BBC’s description emphasizes that 
any move to set up an independent Kurdish nation-state has been brutally quashed, despite the victors of WW1 
having made provision for a Kurdish state in the Treaty of Sèvres. In Syria, Kurds have been denied their basic 
rights and suppressed by the Syrian regime; and in Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s brutal attack using poison gas on 
 1 Situated close to Syria’s Northern border with Turkey.
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the Iraqi Kurds underlines the tortuous history of a persecuted people (“Who are the Kurds?”, 2017). There is 
no question about the suffering that Syrian and Iraqi Kurds have had to endure. This report does not intend to 
question said suffering.
The narrative about Kurdish groups has been highly affected by the development in the security situation 
over the last couple of years, and the Kurdish groups now represent heavily armed forces and serve as  important 
allies in the fight against ISIS. The political party of Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD), and its armed wing 
(YPG), went from being a largely unknown group at the beginning of the Syrian conflict to become the leading 
actor in the multi-ethnic Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), defending and controlling large parts of Northern 
Syria and putting Turkey on high alert. In 2016, Kurdish Peshmerga forces expanded their territory to Kirkuk 
in Iraq, and after having halted ISIS advances they defended a more than 1,000-kilometer-long border with 
ISIS-held territory.
Aim of the Book
In relation to the future security and political developments in Iraq and Syria, there is a need for  developing 
more comprehensive knowledge of the different Kurdish groups in the region. This book’s objective is to 
 examine the main Kurdish groupings and their affiliations and interactions with other Kurdish groups, as well 
as other key state actors in the surrounding region. By focusing on political goals, cooperation or rivalries, and 
political institutions, the report will contribute to knowledge about important actors and Western allies in the 
Middle East. Consequently, this book will seek to:
Examine the internal coherence between the Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish entities and their alignments in 
the fight against ISIS.
Research Design
The authors have chosen an explorative case study as the research design for the study. The distinct  phenomena 
of the internal coherence of the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds is characterized by a lack of detailed preliminary 
research. As such an explorative approach is needed to investigate the phenomena. The study will generally 
be guided and limited by the research question, ensuring coherence and relevance for the data collection. The 
study explores the research question through available open sources in order to analyze and compare these 
sources with the groups’ self-stated political alignments, ideology and military alliances.
The study will examine the Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish groups that were and are engaged in the fight against 
ISIS in order to provide an overview of the different Kurdish groupings operating in Syria and Iraq  respectively. 
The key questions guiding the research are: What are their political goals? Do the groupings display coherence 
 internally? And what are their external alignments? By asking these questions, the study will describe the  political 
objectives and capacities of the groups thereby building a foundation for an assessment of the  coherence within 
and among the groups.
Several Western democracies are part of the US-led coalition against ISIS, and the coalition actively supports 
Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish groups in their fight on the ground. This relationship works both ways, as they also 
serve as a very important ally by supporting the coalition’s fight in terms of putting boots on the ground. In a 
democracy, foreign policy per definition rests on the democratic mandate provided by the citizens. Hence, this 
study’s contribution is to policy-makers as well as the public, and it sets out to provide in-depth information 
on the Kurdish groups supported by the West. The ongoing nature of the conflict only further emphasizes the 
importance of a contemporary historical background about the Kurdish groups involved in the conflict. Future 
political decisions concerning continued support need to consider this knowledge if sustainable solutions are 
to be identified.
Because this study aims at providing contemporary information on the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds, an  exploratory 
case study will be applied as the research design. The case study will be empirically driven using open sources 
centered on information and sources rather than applying a theoretical framework that in its nature seeks to 
explain and simplify dynamics. This approach has been chosen in order to bring in as much  information as 
possible without incorporating it into a theoretical framework. This carries a caveat in terms of non-coherence 
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in relation to the conclusion, but at the same time, the empirical approach complies well with the study’s 
 objective to describe a relatively undescribed subject, Bøgh Andersen, Møller Hansen, & Klemmensen (2010) 
and other scholars will be left with the task of applying the results from this study in a comprehensive  theoretical 
 framework. Consequently, this study aspires to bring forth the present data on the Kurdish groups in order to 
study in depth the various aspects, groups, and episodes, rather than having the study’s analysis conducted 
within the closed framework of a theory. By not having the study undertaken within the framework of a theory, 
the study also comes with other limitations and caveats. Theory-based studies allow examination of causality 
and probability – traits, which this study therefore cannot achieve. Furthermore, a theory ensures that con-
cepts are usually well defined, which enhances the researcher’s ability to measure the desired  objectives across 
 various sources, increasing the validity and reliability of the study. Although the traits associated with a theory-
driven study are appealing, the task at hand calls for a research design that can facilitate in-depth answers to 
the research question, rather than the most convenient theoretical fit. To provide a historical background and 
explain the internal coherence between the various Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish groups, operating an empirically 
driven case study is considered to yield the best results.
Case Selection
Andrew Bennet defines a case as “an instance of a class of events of interest to the investigator” (George & 
 Bennett, 2005, p. 17). This definition highlights the importance of the investigator’s role in selecting the case 
rather than defining a case as a historical happening in itself. The case of the Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish groups 
and their fight against ISIS has been chosen in this context because it can be determined as an important aspect 
of a historical happening. The challenge in selecting a case based on interest and not statistics, or a most/least 
likely case, is the low generalizability associated with the study’s results (George & Bennett, 2005). However, as 
stated, the study’s focus is to describe the case and not to develop a generalized model for future application. 
The latter is the main argument for the chosen research design as the gains from an exploratory case study 
design exceeds the limitations and caveats.
Data Collection and Analysis
The empirical data for the study was collected in the period January 2016 – July 2017. Since the study has an 
exploratory focus on the Kurdish groups involved in the fight against ISIS, the analysis has revolved around 
an inductive examination of the collected data. However, as the chosen case is an ongoing armed conflict, an 
Epilogue has been included in order to capture and reflect on the latest major developments in the region. 
Furthermore, the majority of the data was collected in the first half year of 2016, at which time there were few 
peer-reviewed academic articles on the subject. This is the main reason why the study to a large extent includes 
secondary literature from think tanks and newspapers rather than academic sources. Realizing this, it became 
an important part of this study to present other researchers and scholars with systematized knowledge of the 
conflict and the Kurdish actors fighting ISIS.2 This entails that the data collection and subsequent analysis 
becomes central to the study’s validity, which is the assurance that the study in fact examines the research 
question it sets out to answer (Bøgh Andersen et al., 2010). The empirically driven research design blurs the 
lines between data collection and analysis as they are interconnected. In the process of answering the research 
question, new aspects, not previously known, had the potential of diverting the focus of the research to explain 
new episodes in depth. To avoid this and to increase the study’s validity, the study will measure the same 
 phenomena across different primary as well as secondary sources.
 2 After the completion of the data collection for this book, the academic literature has started to look into the relationships between 
the various Kurdish groups and factions. In the book “Iraqi Kurdistan, PKK, and International Relations (2017), Hannes Černy  studies 
Kurdish ethno-nationalist actors by analyzing the  relationship between PKK and Iraqi Kurdish political parties. However, parts of 
the emerging  literature holds on to the notion of the Kurds as a coherent political group such as David L. Philips in “The Kurdish 
Spring” (2018). Looking ahead, Routledge is set to publish a “Handbook on the Kurds” in 2019,  highlighting the renewed interest in 
the Kurds and their role in the region.
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The analytical strategy is initially to identify and subsequently analyze reports on the Iraqi and Syrian  Kurdish 
groups’ fight against ISIS. These secondary sources will serve as a backbone for providing a contextual frame 
and thereby an overview of the general Kurdish-led war against ISIS. Based on secondary sources, the analysis 
will begin to consider primary sources as close to the actors as possible in order to gain a better  understanding 
of their role in and perception of the examined events described in the secondary literature. If the primary 
sources revealed new information or aspects, further research was then conducted to evaluate whether new 
contextual elaboration or additions were required for the secondary sources. In order to avoid losing the study’s 
main direction or acquire too much information, the selection of the data was based exclusively on the premise 
of whether the data would help to answer the research question or not.
A Critical View on the Main Sources Used in This Study
The secondary sources used in the study vary much and therefore face different caveats. The secondary sources 
can be grouped into three different categories: International think tanks, local media, and international media. 
The specific caveats pertaining to each category, as well as the efforts taken to address them, are described 
below.
The first category of secondary sources covers international think tanks such as International Crisis Group, 
the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, and Jane’s IHS examinations of the Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish groups. The 
reports contribute with rich interviews from high-ranking Syrian and Iraqi officials and officers, analysis of 
the situation on the ground, and explanations of the historical context affecting the conflict. The International 
Crisis Group describes itself as an independent organization that seeks to prevent wars and shape policies that 
will promote a more peaceful world (International Crisis Group, n.d.-b). Western governments such as those 
of the US, Germany, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries support the ICG financially (International 
Crisis Group, n.d.-a). The Carnegie Endowment for Peace is an international think tank with offices around the 
world. Their stated mission is to advance the cause of peace through analysis and development of new policy 
ideas that can shape direct engagement and collaboration. Half of its funding stems from the initial gift of 
Andrew Carnegie, helping to ensure the think tank’s independence and ability to pursue its mission (Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2018). According to a financial transparency study, both organizations 
scored a rating of 4/5 on transparency about who funds them and how much they receive (Transparify, n.d., 
2015). This transparency is highly valued as a means of understanding their possible embedded and/or biased 
interests. The funding the International Crisis Group receives from Western democracies could influence its 
ability to avoid policy solutions that are biased and based on promoting solutions favoring the values of liberal 
democracies. A closer view at the authors behind the reports from the Carnegie Endowment for Peace shows 
that a majority of the experts used have been stationed in the conflict areas, but they have all received higher 
education from Western Universities, which naturally affects the analysis in a direction of Western perceptions. 
With this possible bias in mind, both organizations and their researchers have a reputation in the academic 
world as being highly skilled, and the knowledge and insights produced by them are often used as references in 
journals and newspapers.3 Unlike the two think tanks above, Jane’s IHS is a profit-based company, focusing on 
providing information, analysis, and expertise to enable smarter decision-making for their clients (IHS Markit, 
n.d.). An examination of the authors’ LinkedIn profiles for the reports from Jane’s IHS used in this study shows 
that they also have been educated at Western universities. As with the other sources in this category, they 
are potentially also biased towards analyzing the conflict from a Western perspective. The critical remarks in 
 relation to the educational background of the authors of these sources is not to say that research from Western-
educated researchers is always biased. However, it is important to mention since especially democracy, liberal-
ism, and emancipation as objectives in themselves indeed can serve as caveats when studying Kurdish groups, 
 3 “International Crisis Group (ICG), one of the most notable and widely referenced producers of knowledge about conflict areas, used 
extensively by policy makers, the media and academics” (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2014, p. 545). The University of Pennsylvania 
 conducts research on the role policy institutes play in governments and civil societies around the world. Through a panel of experts 
from the print, electronic media, academic the most influential think tanks are chosen. The Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace was chosen as the fifth and International Crisis Group as the 26th most influential think-tanks in the world (2016)  underlining 
their importance in academia and the media (McGann, 2017, p. 46).
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as well as the general security situation in Iraq, Syria, and the surrounding region. For this reason, local Kurdish 
sources have also been applied when possible in order to balance the data as much as possible.
The second category is local sources reporting on the events, such as the Kurdish newspapers Ekurd (n.d.) 
and Rudaw (n.d.). The journalists of these local media sources have a profound understanding of the context 
and presumably a better logistical and local network than internationally based media. A caveat they might face 
are legal challenges imposed on their media by the local government, limiting and obstructing their finances 
and freedom of expression. Furthermore, they can also be affected by an editorial line that is based on a given 
cause or role in the local areas. These sources should therefore not stand alone, as the independent media, 
notably in Iraqi Kurdistan is challenged. This subject will be written out in the chapter of this book describing 
the Iraqi Kurdish region. The local Kurdish medias will therefore by analyzed through the prism of the  political 
party backing or financing it to limit potential bias on the study. An example of this, is the pro-KDP Iraqi 
news station of Rudaw, which was founded by former KRG president Massoud Barzani’s son Masrour Barzani 
(Chomani, 2014).
The third category is international media’s reporting of the situation, ranging from UK-based BBC to Qatar-
based Al-Jazeera. When analyzing and fact-checking these sources, it is important to read them through 
the prism of their cultures. For instance, when referring to a Turkish source like Hürriyet Daily News, the 
articles’ discourse and embedded interest must be critically assessed. As an example, Turkey’s president has 
 explicitly called for regime change in Syria and is currently involved in a violent conflict with the Turkish 
 Kurdish  organization Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK). Turkish reporting on the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds 
could  therefore be influenced by these factors in another way than a UK- or US-based reporter’s first-hand 
 assessment. On-the-ground news reports from the BBC and Al-Jazeera are also not treated as impartial 
 reporting in the context of the prior caveats mentioned, and it is therefore important to underline that the 
primary sources of this kind also will not stand alone in the analysis.
The primary sources used in this study range from the actors’ and organizations’ own means of 
 communication such as uploaded videos, descriptions or proclamations made on their webpages. These 
provide the best  reference to examine and thereby understand their political goals and perceptions. 
Whenever possible, the study will strive to find and include these sources. Caveats associated are rare in 
terms of how they have been applied – namely as primary sources. They represent the examined actors’ 
interest, and due to the evolving accessibility and low cost of internet communication, they can be posted 
without having to adhere to other publications’ embedded interest or rules. They are in their nature biased 
and can therefore never stand alone.
As mentioned above, it is our ambition that this book encourages further studies within this field. The 
 empirical, explorative research design ensures that the study focuses its resources by diving into various 
sources’ perceptions of the Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish groups’ fight against ISIS, and thereby strives to provide a 
balanced account to the general public, future studies, and policy-makers. To fulfill this ambition, the study will 
be conducted using only English-language and openly accessible sources, which allows anyone to go behind 
the provided analysis by crosschecking the referred sources and hopefully identifying other possibilities for 
application of the sources on the various subjects presented. A caveat to be mentioned is, of course, that the 
above-mentioned ambition excludes articles written in Kurdish or Arabic which, from the authors’ point of 
view, intentionally inspires (or provokes) multi-lingual specialists to take research on this area further. Taking 
this into account, it should be noted, that although the sources investigated are in English, a large majority are 
written by local newspapers and organizations who have sought to communicate to a Western audience. As this 
book is intended a Western audience, describing the internal coherence between the Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish 
entities and their alignments in the fight against ISIS through local anchored voices and institutions matches 
the studies ambition.
Structure of the Book
To ensure a comprehensive examination of the internal coherence between the Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish enti-
ties and their alignments in the fight against ISIS the book is organized into two main parts: Part One analyses 
the alliances, capacities, and political objectives of various Syrian Kurdish groups. This part of the book also 
discusses the implications of PYD’s proclamation of the Federation of Northern Syria and the alleged affiliation 
between the PYD/YPG and the PKK. Part Two then analyses in depth the alliances, capacities, and political 
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objectives of various groups within the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. This part of the book focuses on the internal 
dynamics of the KRG as well as the implications of the independence referendum.
Finally, the internal coherence among the Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish groups as well as their transnational 
coherence is assessed in the conclusion. The conclusion also provides an overview of the policy implications of 
continued or enhanced support to these groups taking into consideration their levels of coherence.
PART ONE
The Syrian Kurds
In order to obtain an understanding of the ‘Syrian Kurds’ it is essential to divide this superficial term into 
smaller political institutional parts. In this part of the book, the alliances, capacities, and political objectives of 
the Democratic Union Party (PYD) / People’s Protection Units (YPG), Kurdish Supreme Committee (KSC), 
The Kurdish National Council (KNC), the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), and the main military body of 
the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are analyzed in depth. Finally, this part of the book provides an assessment 
of international actors’ positions towards the Syrian Kurdish groups and a discussion of the likely side effects 
of continued support to the SDF.
The Kurdish Supreme Committee
The Kurdish Supreme Committee (KSC) was established in June 2012 in Erbil (Iraq) to unite the rivaling Syrian 
Kurdish parties of PYD and KNC and promote common Kurdish objectives (MacDonald, 2014; “Member of 
National Council,” 2013). This attempt to share power between KNC and PYD came to an end in late January 
2014, when PYD unilaterally declared the democratic autonomous cantons of Afrin, Kobane and Jazira within 
the Kurdish-controlled area of Syria under the name of Rojava (Western Kurdistan) (Çelebi, 2016; Ford & 
Yassir, 2015). This breakaway had long been underway with tensions rising in the wake of the establishment 
of KSC. The two parties agreed to share the power equally, but this was never implemented and according to 
the KNC this was due to PYD’s attempt to take full control with the KSC (International Crisis Group, 2014). 
Conversely, it could also be seen as a political move by KNC to weaken PYD at a time of the latter’s political 
and military ascent.
In 2013, PYD and its military wing, YPG, largely controlled all Kurdish areas in Northern Syria both politi-
cally and militarily (“Member of National Council,” 2013). As of 2014, PYD/YPG had risen to a level that made 
it able to pursue its political project of democratic autonomy without the approval of KNC, which it evidently 
did. Since then YPG has been the strongest Kurdish militia in Syria capable of fighting off ISIS and Al-Nusra 
from Kurdish heartland areas (“KRG Says It Won’t Deal,” 2014; van Wilgenburg, 2013b).
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Map 1: Syria, Archive: RDDC.
The Syrian Kurds 9
Kurdish Supreme Committee (KSC)
Established The Kurdish Supreme Committee was established in June 2012 in Erbil (Iraq) to unite the rivaling 
Syrian Kurdish parties of PYD and KNC under the leadership of president Massoud Barzani (KRG) 
(“Member of National Council,” 2013).




KSC is to consist of an equal number of members from KNC and PYD in its councils (“Member of 
National Council,” 2013; “Rojava: A Syrian Kurdish Democracy,” n.d.).
Armed Forces On paper, PYD’s armed wing, YPG, and KNC’s Iraqi Peshmerga fighters, but in reality, it is based 
entirely on YPG (International Crisis Group, 2014).
Political Goals To administer and defend the captured territory in Northern Syria by dividing power equally 
between PYD and KNC (Ford & Yassir, 2015; “Member of National Council,” 2013). To decrease 
tension and potential clashes between the various Kurdish forces operating in Northern Syria 
(MacDonald, 2014).
The end of the 
Kurdish Supreme 
Committee
According to International Crisis Group (2014), the power sharing deal remained a dead letter. 
The agreement to share power 50-50 was never implemented and the power balance within the 
committee quickly tipped towards PYD dominance and was de facto ended in 2014, when PYD 
unilaterally declared Rojava as three autonomous democratic cantons.
Table 1: Kurdish Supreme Committee (KSC).
PYD seeks to implement its political project of democratic autonomy in Rojava through an umbrella organi-
zation called the Tev-Dem that was organized in July 2011(Kurdwatch, 2013). Tev-Dem is the governing 
body of Rojava and it runs schools, youth councils, women’s organizations, trade unions, etc. The relationship 
between the Tev-Dem and PYD is described by the latter’s co-leader Asya Abdullah as: “Our party is now 
politically leading the democratic revolution in Syria’s Kurdistan while Tev-Dem is socially doing so. We are 
in search of a democratic society organized from below” (Ahmad, 2013, para. 15). Critics say the Tev-Dem 
is dominated and run by PYD and its allies rather than various independent parties as it officially claims 
(International Crisis Group, 2014; Kurdwatch, 2013; MacDonald, 2014). The governance system set up in 
Rojava is also accused of appointing courts personnel in the People’s Tribunal based on party loyalty to PYD 
as the determining  requirement (International Crisis Group, 2014; Kurdwatch, 2013). Furthermore, the three 
 cantons are bound by the Social Contract of Rojava, which includes articles with left-wing political declara-
tions, such as Article 30, which gives all persons the right to work, social security, health, and adequate housing 
( Kurdistan National Congress, 2014). This clearly indicates that the Tev-Dem governance system is at the very 
least strongly  influenced by PYD and its decision-making.
The KSC has not achieved its objective of uniting the rivaling Syrian Kurdish parties of PYD and KNC. Below 
are some of the episodes that led to the increased tension and eventual split from a united Syrian  Kurdish 
 political body:
•	 KNC dissatisfaction with PYD’s alleged ties and cooperation with the Syrian Government 
( MacDonald, 2014; van Wilgenburg, 2013b; van Wilgenburg, 2016b).
•	 Ideological differences between the two parties about how the new region should be governed.
•	 KNC’s claims that YPG has abducted and tortured its members and violently cracked down on its 
protests (Barwari, 2013; Carnegie Middle East Center, n.d.; Human Rights Watch, 2014; Kurdwatch, 
2013).
•	 Proxy struggles between rivaling Kurdish leaders at the regional level (“Member of National 
 Council,” 2013).
•	 Iraqi KDP-leader Barzani’s meddling in the conflict (International Crisis Group, 2014).
•	 The PYD does not recognize KNC’s Peshmerga force and will not allow them to enter Syria unless 
they fight under YPG command (Shiwesh & Osman, 2015; Soz, 2016).
•	 The YPG forces have clashed with KNC-member organizations in minor but lethal incidents (van 
Wilgenburg, 2013a).
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Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat – Democratic Union Party (PYD) /  
Yekîneyên Parastina Gel – People’s Protection Units (YPG)
Established PYD, a political party, was established in 2003 (International Crisis Group, 2014). YPG, a 
military organization, was established in 2004 as the armed wing of the PYD (Spyer, 2016). 
The PYD and YPG are closely intertwined and PYD’s political control of YPG is the reason 
these are treated as a single entity.
Territory Northern Syria, the two territories of Kobane & Jazira. This area goes under the Kurdish 
name of Rojava (Western Kurdistan). The territory of Afrin was also under PYD’s control 
until Turkey under operation Olive Branch in January 2018 took control of it (Kucukgocmen & 
Dolan, 2018).
Organizational 
Structure / Armed 
Forces
PYD Co-leader: Salih Muslim Mohammed. PYD is the most influential Kurdish political 
party in Rojava (Syria). It has declared compulsory military service for men between the ages 
of 18 and 30 for the defense of Rojava (Baladi, 2016).
YPG is the armed wing of PYD and consists of an armed force of approximately 40-60,000 
fighters, including the YPJ (Women’s Protection Units) fighters (O’Hanlon, 2016; Perry, 
2016a). 
Political Goals 1) A federal, democratic, and secular Rojava.
2)  Protecting Rojava militarily and politically from ISIS and political opponents to its political 
project.
3) Reunite Rojava’s territory.
Ideology A democratic self-management society, based on decentralization, without discrimination 
against gender, religion, race, creed, or doctrine. A society with freedom of religion and 
respect for human rights: Every citizen has the right to work and adequate housing, social 
security, and health (Charter of the Social Contract in Rojava (Syria), 2014). 
Perceived Threats Internal: ISIS; al-Nusra; Free Syrian Army; the Syrian Regime.
External: Turkey.
Competitors KNC Kurdish National Council




Operative partners and 
alliances
US: Strategic, air-support and arms drops (Bradley & Parkinson, 2015; “Islamic State: Why 
Turkey prefers,” 2014; Perry, 2016a).
Russia: PYD/YPG has made significant territorial gains after Russian air-attacks cleared their 
way by attacking ISIS and Rebel groups (Loveluck, 2016; van Wilgenburg, 2016a, 2016e).
The Syrian Regime: PYD/YPG has taken advantage of the regime’s advance to seize territory 
(van Wilgenburg, 2016e). The regime and PYD/YPG have also managed to avoid large-
scale conflicts and clashes, which suggests they could operate within a non-aggression pact 
(Loveluck, 2016).
Table 2: Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat – Democratic Union Party (PYD) / Yekîneyên Parastina Gel – People’s Protection 
Units (YPG).
Kurdish National Council Post KSC
The Kurdish National Council’s (KNC) power in Syria sharply declined as a result of its rivalry with PYD/YPG 
in what appears to have been a zero-sum game for political control of the Syrian Kurdish areas (Rojava). This 
has led the two parties to pursue their political goals for Kurdish autonomy in Syria through different means. 
During this rivalry, the KNC has struggled with internal political disagreement and frequent splits between 
its members. Many of these splits were due to personal disputes rather than political ones. Furthermore, the 
supporters of the different KNC parties are spread out across Rojava’s territory, further expanding the internal 
gap (Kurdwatch, 2013).
In terms of military strength, the KNC’s armed forces, the Rojava Peshmerga, are situated in Iraq as they 
are denied entry to Rojava (Syria) by PYD, unless they join the ranks of YPG, which would effectively dismiss 
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KNC’s potential military capacity in Syria (Arafat, 2016c; KNC Geneva Office, n.d.; van Wilgenburg, 2016m). 
To understand why the Rojava Peshmergas are barred from entering Rojava (Syria), it is important to take an 
old Kurdish rivalry between the two largest Kurdish groups the Turkish PKK and the Iraqi KDP into account. 
The Rojava Peshmerga and the KNC are backed by Barzani, the KRG’s president (KDP). It is his elite Zeravani 
Force who have trained the Rojava Peshmerga brigade of approximately 5,000 fighters. Furthermore, Barzani 
has actively sought to promote the Rojova Peshmerga as an alternative option for the US to rely on to fight ISIS 
in Syria (“Barzani-loyal Rojava,” 2017; “Dream on hold,” 2016; Ignatius, 2016; “Rival Kurdish groups,” 2017). 
A policy move that would increase Barzani’s influence in Syria and relatively decrease PYD’s, which he sees as 
identical to the PKK.
The relationship between the two Syrian Kurdish parties of KNC and PYD post-KSC appears to have been 
heavily influenced by old Kurdish rivalries and mistrust, rather than a common goal to combat ISIS under 
a unified banner of Syrian Kurds. In 2016, PYD was the strongest political group with military control of 
Rojava (Syria) through its armed wing YPG. This development has led the PYD and KNC to pursue differ-
ent strategies. While PYD is implementing its political self-governing democratic system and managing the 
multi-ethnic armed group of the Syrian Democratic Forces, KNC is pursuing its political goals at the inter-
national negotiation table through various Syrian opposition groups. First, the KNC sought to advance its 
goals through the Syrian National Council (SNC) founded in Istanbul in 2011 to unite the various opposition 
groups to President Bashar al-Assad in Syria (Carnegie Middle East Center, 2013). The KNC was a member 
of the SNC almost since its creation in 2011. However, the membership was not without disagreements as the 
Arab political groups within the SNC umbrella have rejected KNC’s cardinal demand for federalism. The Arab 
political groups favored a unitary state, which led the KNC to break with the SNC in 2013 (Carnegie Middle 
East Center, n.d.). The same year the KNC signed an agreement to join the National Coalition of Syrian Revo-
lutionary and Opposition Forces (NC) – a larger Syrian political opposition block, in which the SNC is also 
present (Carnegie Middle East Center, 2012). The agreement recognizes the constitutional rights of the Kurd-
ish people. It changed the name of the “Syrian Arab Republic” to the “Syrian Republic,” which would recognize 
the pluralistic society of Syria and not solely the Arab population (Hemeidi, 2013; KNC Geneva Office, 2016b). 
The KNC’s entrance to the NC has granted them an internationally recognized platform to advance their politi-
cal goals. Although the NC continues to oppose the KNC’s demand for federalism and frequently disagree on 
several topics, they continue to be a voice within the NC fighting to advance Kurdish issues (Allsopp, 2016; 
KNC Geneva Office, 2016f).
On February 27, 2016, KNC opened an office in Geneva to advance its political goals at the High Negotia-
tion Committee (HNC), where it has a seat (KNC Geneva Office, 2016a). The HNC is a Saudi-backed umbrella 
organization, which represents the main Syrian opposition groups at the Geneva peace talks to end the Syrian 
civil war. It consists of the NC, KNC, independent groups and personalities and various opposition forces from 
the Free Syrian Army (FSA) (Daher, 2017). In September 2016, the HNC, laid out an executive framework for a 
political solution in Syria which was critically received by KNC. In a press release, the KNC stated “The HNC’s 
executive framework will neither bring peace nor equality” and that “…this document is not part of the solu-
tion” (KNC Geneva Office, 2016g, para. 2). Thus, rejecting the framework as a danger to a democratic, pluralis-
tic, and unified Syria due to its explicit listing of “Arab culture and Islam as sources for intellectual production 
and social relations” (KNC Geneva Office, 2016g, para. 3).
The KNC continues to struggle with the Syrian opposition represented in the High Negotiation Committee 
on the question of a federal state and ill-spoken comments about the Kurds (Arafat, 2016d; van Wilgenburg, 
2016h). However, the KNC has managed to make progress in achieving the opposition’s recognition of Kurd-
ish culture, language, and other rights (Hamed, 2015; KNC Geneva Office, 2016e). In June 2016, the relations 
between NC and KNC faced another setback in terms of conflicting values and goals as KNC decided not to 
be a part of a newly NC-founded interim government for Syria. The KNC described the new interim govern-
ment for Syria as inadequate and irresponsible and with a lack of involvement from women and different ethnic 
groups (General Secretariat of the Kurdish National Council in Syria, 2016).
In addition to the various disagreements between the KNC and HNC, which remain to be resolved, KNC’s 
strategy to align with the Syrian Arab opposition is fragile and could backfire since the Syrian Kurds have 
 frequently clashed with different groups of the Syrian Arab opposition. In 2016, an Arab opposition group that 
was part of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) attacked the Kurdish neighborhood of Sheik Maqsoud in northern 
Aleppo ( van Wilgenburg, 2016k). This brought the KNC to make an official announcement of the attacks on 
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Sheik Maqsoud, calling on all to denounce the attacks and claiming that the attacks were carried out by the al-
Nusra Front and allies, in order to ease the tensions between different factions of the Syrian Kurds and Arabs. 
The KNC could lose legitimacy amongst Kurds if the Arab opposition they are collaborating with is linked to 
attacks on Kurds. Such a scenario may drive the KNC and PYD further away from a political solution or make 
the KNC break away from the peace talks, which would reduce the HNC’s legitimacy as  representing Syria. 
However, as PYD has accused groups of the Syrian Coalition of continued targeting of Kurds in Aleppo, it 
is obvious that PYD found KNC’s relationship with the Arab opposition troublesome at best (Arafat, 2016b; 
van Wilgenburg, 2016l). While verification that these attacks were carried out by the Arab opposition aligned 
to KNC cannot be obtained, it nevertheless implies negative consequences for KNC to be associated with 
Arab forces when Kurds are attacked. This clearly shows a division between the Syrian Kurds on whether 
it is  possible to work within the framework of an Arab opposition. As KNC is backed by Barzani, a further 
 escalation between the KNC and PYD could spill over to divide the Iraqi and Syrian Kurds loyal to Barzani and 
the Turkish and Syrian Kurds loyal to PYD and PKK further, if no political compromise is found.
Syrian Democratic Forces and Syrian Democratic Council
In 2015, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) alliance was founded to fight ISIS and defend the people of  Northern 
Syria. Although it quickly proved successful in absorbing new groups and fighters of different  ethnicities and 
religions into its ranks, the military bulk of SDF was YPG fighters (“Syrian-Kurdish SDF,” 2016). The SDF is 
not associated with the NC or FSA as their political and military goals differ. The US openly  supported the 
establishment of the SDF and backed the alliance militarily through airstrikes, weapon supplies, and tactical 
advisors (Strack, 2015). In 2016, the SDF conducted approximately 25% of all operations against ISIS in Syria, 
hereby positioning it as a key US ally due to the ground presence of the group’s fighters. In the wake of this 
Kurdish National Council (KNC)
Established In October 2011, in Erbil Iraq, under the sponsorship of Iraqi Kurdish Regional President 
Masoud Barzani, former leader of the Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and president of 
the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) from 2005-2017 (Human Rights Watch, 2014). 





KNC is an umbrella organization of 12 parties, which holds assemblies to determine their 
political policies (KNC Geneva Office, n.d.). KNC struggles with unity and coherence across its 
Syrian parties.
Armed Forces Rojava Peshmerga: Sharvan Derki, spokesperson of the Rojava Peshmerga described their 
military capacity as 5,000 soldiers, who are currently based in Iraqi Kurdistan and sponsored by 
KDP (“Barzani-loyal Rojava,” 2017; “Rojava Peshmerga deployed,” 2017).
Political Goals Kurdish autonomy under a federal model in Syria without discriminatory laws and policies, 
such as the prohibition against the use of the Kurdish language(Carnegie Middle East Center, 
n.d.).
Ideology A parliamentarian republic system with rule of law, separation of powers, and equal citizenship 
as opposed to PYD democratic self-management. (KNC Geneva Office, n .d.)
Rivals PYD/YPG
Alliances KDP, NC and HNC. 
Operative partners 
and alliances 
KNC pursues a balanced relationship with Turkey. KNC blames PYD/YPG for upscaling a 
military conflict with Turkey (KNC Geneva Office, 2016c). KDP and NC are both strong allies 
of Turkey, which likely pushes KNC to take a balanced stand toward Turkey. After having 
condemned Turkey’s shelling of Kurdish areas in Northern Syria, a KNC representative said, 
“The council [KNC] asks PYD not to fight the Syrian national opposition and not to involve the 
Kurdish people [of Syria] in a war against Turkey” (Arafat, 2016a, para. 6).
Table 3: Kurdish National Council (KNC).
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position, the group has managed to expand its territory. At the end of 2017, the alliance controlled the majority 
of Northern Syria’s border regions along the border to Turkey, except for a territory between the Kurdish region 
of Afrin and Kobane. This territory was controlled by ISIS until August 2016, when Turkey began “Operation 
Euphrates Shield” – a seven-month-long military campaign to clear 100 kilometers of ISIS-controlled  territory 
along its border and halt the Kurds from uniting their cantons (Itani & Stein, 2016; Osborne, 2017). 
Turkey’s intervention in Syria and the Syrian Government’s successful campaign in retaking Aleppo and 
the  surrounding territory have left the territories between the Kurdish cantons separated by Turkey and its 
 military-backed FSA and Assad’s forces (Hubbard, 2016; “Mapping out Syria’s,” 2017).
In December 2015, the mounting success of SDF advances led to the establishment of a political branch, 
the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), which along with SDF includes different ethnicities. The organization’s 
members had to share the organization’s secular and democratic values. The SDC is led by a joint Kurdish and 
Arab leadership. The co-leadership started as Ilham Ahmed, a Kurd, and former member of the  executive 
 committee of the Movement for a Democratic Society (TEM-DEV) and Haytham Manna, an Arab and 
 co-founder of the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change – an organization in which PYD also is 
a member. Manna is also the spokesperson of the Qamah Movement, an SDF ally, and sources describe him as 
a secularist, human rights advocate, a critic of Islamist rebels, and in favor of the Kurdish secular social contract 
(“Haytham Manna Elected,” 2015; Lund, 2015; “TEV-DEM:,” 2015).
As mentioned above, the SDF and SDC consist of different ethnicities, which provides the possibility of e.g. 
sending Sunni Arab fighters against ISIS in areas with a heavy Sunni Arab population. Besides limiting SDF 
casualties, this approach contains a higher chance for a sustainable development as the Arab fighters naturally 
have more legitimacy than Kurdish fighters do in these areas (Strack, 2015). Though SDF was founded as a joint 
organization between Kurdish and Arab groups, many observers argue that YPG de facto has full control of 
the SDF alliance (Argentieri, 2016; Micallef, 2016; Osborne, 2016; Soz, 2016). In the beginning of 2016, YPG 
 fighters made up a vast majority of the SDF forces. General Joseph L. Votel, commander of the US Special 
Operations Command assessed in March 2016 that 80% of the SDF fighters were Kurdish and from within the 
ranks of YPG. Other sources and articles suggest that up to 90% were YPG soldiers simply transferred into 
the rank numbers of SDF (Bertrand, 2015; Committee on Armed Services, 2016; Miles, 2016). Since then, the 
number of Arab fighters have soared and now constitutes 40% of the SDF fighting force according to  Lieutenant 
SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) / SDC (Syrian Democratic Council)
Established SDF serves as an umbrella organization, facilitating the military alliance in Northern Syria between 13 
organizations of different ethnicities. The military alliance was established in October 2015 by these 
organizations and later designated as the armed forces of SDC (Strack, 2015). SDC is the political 
branch of SDF. It is also multi-ethnic and secular. It was established in December 2015 and is led 
by co-leadership between Kurdish and Arab representatives. (“Kurdish-Arab coalition in Syria forms 
political wing,” 2015)
Territory SDF controls a multi-ethnic territory in Northern Syria, bordering with Turkey for more than 400 
kilometers. SDF has retaken more than 18,000 square kilometers of territory from ISIS (U.S. Central 
Command, 2016).
Structure SDF consists primarily of Kurdish YPG units, with the other ethnicities representing a smaller 
contingent of the forces (Strack, 2015). SDC is a forty-two-member council, consisting of at least 
one member from every ethnicity represented in the organization. It is led by a Kurdish and Arab 
co-leadership (“Haytham Manna Elected,” 2015; “Kurdish-Arab coalition in Syria creates political 
wing,” 2015).
Armed Forces The military capacities of SDF’s groups make up a total of 50,000-55,000 fighters: 27,000-40,000 YPG 
and 20,000-23,000 non-YPG (Hennesy-Fiske, 2017; McLeary, 2017; O’Hanlon, 2016; Strack, 2015).
Political Goals SDF/SDC’s current stated strategic goal is to confront and expel ISIS from Syria and bring about a 
decentralized democratic political system in Syria (Al-Khalidi & Perry, 2015; Spyer, 2016; Strack, 2015).
Alignment to 
PYD
SDF’s goals and perceived threats are strongly influenced by the PYD/YPG, which emphasizes 
democratic autonomy in Rojava (the Kurdish regions of Northern Syria). The SDF should therefore be 
viewed as an actor whose main political objectives are in close accordance with those of PYD. 
Table 4: SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) / SDC (Syrian Democratic Council).
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General Stephen Townsend, commander, Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2017). However, the number of Arab and Kurdish fighters in the ranks of SDF alone 
does not in itself determine the level of influence the different ethnicities in SDF have in the decision-making 
process. To understand who ‘calls the shots’ and makes up the main fighting elements of the SDF, the military 
campaigns and political achievements of the SDF must be analyzed.
Syrian Democratic Forces’ Major Military Campaigns
In February 2016, Turkey responded to SDF advances across the Euphrates River by shelling SDF forces in 
Northern Syria, without differentiating between the Arab, Christian, or Kurdish fighters under the banner 
of the SDF, indicating that Ankara viewed SDF and YPG as the exact same entity (Seckin & Ali, 2016). As 
described above, this view of the YPG and SDF (as almost entirely overlapping) is shared by numerous sources. 
The strong PYD/YPG influence over the alliance also manifests itself when assessing SDF’s large territorial 
gains in Northern Syria and the current advances across the Euphrates and near Azaz. Co-President of the 
SDC, Ilham Ahmed, says military actions by SDF to unify Afrin at this time were underway in parallel with 
eliminating ISIS in these regions (Demirel, 2016b; “Kurdish-Arab coalition in Syria creates political wing,” 
2015). However, this subsequently proved to be impossible.
PYD/YPG has explicitly stated its interest in uniting Rojava, and with the territorial advances in  Northern 
Syria, it seemed even more likely that the SDF would give priority to this objective leaving the expulsion of 
ISIS from Raqqa a secondary objective. As there are coinciding elements in cutting off Raqqa’s supply route 
from Turkey, SDF was presented with an opportunity to pursue both objectives with the same operations, 
which naturally boosted SDF’s external as well as internal recognition (Spyer, 2016). In April 2016, SDF 
began  preparations for an assault on the city of Manbij by setting up a war council as well as a civilian  council 
appointed to govern the city once liberated. The Manbij assault was a bold move by the SDF because it is 
located between Kobane and Afrin inside the Azaz-Jarablus line and naturally, a redline was set up by Turkey 
to halt further Kurdish advances toward uniting the cantons (“Syrian Democratic Forces preparing,” 2016; van 
 Wilgenburg, 2016j).
In May 2016, President Obama and President Erdoğan negotiated an agreement that allowed an SDF-led 
offence to capture the Syrian city of Manbij. According to the Wall Street Journal, Turkey consented to the 
Manbij offense led by SDF under the assurances that US Special Forces along with Arab members of the SDF 
played a vital role and that Manbij would be governed by an Arab council after the city was retaken (Abi-Habib 
& Coker, 2016). A month later, SDF began advancing towards Manbij backed by intense US airstrikes and 
accompanied by US commanders. Whether this was a result of Turkey taking a more relaxed stand towards 
SDF is rather doubtful. An unnamed US official told the Washington Post: “the Turks are ‘not happy’ about 
it” (Sly & DeYoung, 2016, para. 8) and Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu stated that a guarantee 
from the US was provided to Turkey to the effect that no YPG units would remain west of the Euphrates 
after the assault on Manbij was complete (“US guarantees no YPG,” 2016). On August 12, 2016, SDF declared 
Manbij fully liberated from ISIS after 72 days of intensive fighting. While the liberation of Manbij served as an 
 important victory against ISIS, it stirred up tensions between SDF and Turkey because the assault was mainly 
carried out by Kurdish YPG fighters, among other Arab fighters under the banner of SDF (Ensor, 2016). In the 
agreement reached between Erdoğan and Obama, the Kurdish fighters of YPG would have had to leave Manbij 
immediately after the assault and return behind the redline set up by Turkey (i.e. west of the Euphrates). A 
statement that was echoed by former Vice-President of the United States Joe Biden: “They (YPG) cannot, will 
not, and under no circumstances get American support if they do not keep that commitment (to move back 
across the river). Period” (Tharoor, 2016, para. 10). Whether or not the YPG elements of SDF would move back 
across the river, the advancements of SDF with US support across Turkey’s redline appear to have prompted 
Turkey to take direct action through its military operation “Euphrates Shield” in Syria to prevent PYD from 
uniting their cantons along its border (Tharoor, 2016). The Turkish military operation began on the August 24, 
only 12 days after SDF declared Manbij liberated, hinting at the stress the SDF Manbij offensive likely caused 
Turkey. While the US had promised Turkey the YPG elements would leave Manbij (which is an Arab majority 
town) to an Arab leadership and withdraw back across the redline, Erdoğan said on February 17, 2017: “We’ve 
told the Obama administration before that Manbij needs to be handed over to the Arabs, and they told us that 
the PYD/YPG was leaving, but unfortunately they never left” (“US military displays SDF,” 2017, para. 9).
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On February 23, 2017, Erdoğan said that the Turkish-backed FSA forces would move to take Manbij after 
completing their mission in Al Bab (a former ISIS-controlled city 24 kilometers south of the Turkish border) 
(Toksabay & Gumrukcu, 2017). In the beginning of March 2017, fighting erupted around Manbij between SDF 
and Turkish-backed fighters leading the US military to deploy a small number of forces in and around  Manbij 
to deter skirmishes between Turks and Kurds – both blaming each other for escalating the attacks (Babb, 
2017). That the US had to deter erupting violence between Turks and Kurds indicates, as Erdoğan has stated, 
that the Kurdish YPG fighters had probably not completely left Manbij as promised.4 However, two develop-
ments seem to have brought an end to the escalating situation and for the time being Turkey’s ambition to 
throw out SDF from Manbij: US efforts to diffuse the situation and the deal between the Manbij War Council 
governing the city and Russia to hand over villages at the frontlines with Turkish forces to the Syrian Regime 
(I. Ali & Stewart, 2017).
In October 2017, the next large operational effort against ISIS came to be the successful assault on Raqqa 
(the prior de-facto capital of ISIS). Turkey had proposed a joint US-Turkish offensive to retake Raqqa. In 
 October 2016, Erdoğan is to have told Obama: “We do not need terrorist organizations like the PYD and YPG 
in the Raqqa operation. Let us work together to sweep DAESH (the Arabic acronym of the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant) from Raqqa” (“Turkey to US,” 2016, para 2). This offer was not accepted by the US, which 
has  continued to rely on SDF and its battle-hardened Kurdish element of YPG to take Raqqa as US boots on 
 Syrian ground never seemed to be an option for the Obama Administration. SDF has also publicly rejected any 
 Turkish role in the Raqqa offensive (Said, Perry, & McDowall, 2016). The Raqqa offensive was long underway – 
with US and SDF preparing to take Raqqa since October 2016, and the US having hoped to begin within weeks 
of that (Ackerman, 2016; Said, Perry, & McDowall, 2016). The assault on Raqqa began June 6, 2017, after SDF 
gradually had encircled the city. According to SDF, 50,000 troops were deployed and Arabs are said to have 
made up 60% of the fighting force (“Raqqa: Syrian Kurdish-led,” 2017). While the Arab fighters on the ground 
might have outnumbered the Kurdish ones, it appears the experienced Kurdish YPG fighters with the inex-
perienced Arab fighters struggling to assert their role carried out the majority of the fighting. The presumably 
secondary role of the Arab fighters to the Kurdish ones followed to some extent the same pattern in the Manbij 
offensive where YPG also took the lead (Davison, 2017; Said, 2017a). As a US official has commented to the 
Washington Post in May 2016 regarding the Manbij offensive: “Kurds are the main fighting force in SDF. We 
shouldn’t be under any illusions about that” (Sly & DeYoung, 2016, para. 7). Another indicator of the strong 
Kurdish control over SDF is open intelligence sources stating that it is only YPG that can call in US-airstrikes 
to support SDF operations (MacDonald, 2015; Spyer, 2016; “Turkish army ready,” 2016).
For many Arab groups in Northern Syria it has been lucrative to join SDF because YPG is a disciplined 
and motivated force fighting ISIS effectively, and becoming part of the US-protected alliance could help them 
free their hometowns. However, according to a defecting Arab SDF commander, the PYD denied the Arab 
 counterparts weapons and a chance to rule their newly liberated cities (Wilkofsky & Fatah, 2017). According 
to IHS Jane’s, the Arab organizations chose to join the SDF partly due to their small numbers of troops and 
because the SDF is an alternative partner against ISIS instead of the Syrian regime. An alliance with the Kurdish 
group was the most attractive offer on the table for many Arab groups, which e.g. Haytham Manna, the leader 
of the SDC Arab block, has expressed (Spyer, 2016).
While most Arab fighters have joined SDF by choice, there have been alarming reports of forced  conscription 
raids being carried out in Northern Syria to fill the ranks of SDF with Arabs and Kurds between 18 and 30 
years of age as the demand for manpower rises with the increasing responsibilities due to SDF’s  territorial 
 expansion (Gutman, 2017; Wilkofsky & Fatah, 2017). Reuters reports that many local Arab tribes from 
 Northern Syria complain about being marginalized in the decision-making and that YPG discriminate against 
their  population through the forced conscription of their youth (Said, 2017b). These tendencies hint that while 
YPG is the strongest military component in SDF, growing discontent from the Arab fighters and communities 
integrated into their political system of Northern Syria could severely escalate once their common enemy, ISIS, 
is defeated, if a political solution is not found.
As shown above, the YPG retains a strong hold on SDF’s military capacity – but how has the SDC, the  political 
wing of the alliance, developed along with SDF’s military advances? On March 17, 2017, PYD  proclaimed the 
 4 Looking back, SDF violated the redline set by Turkey as the last military advisors from YPG left Manbij in July 2018 according to the 
Manbij Military Council (a member of the SDF) after a deal was brokered between the US and Turkey (Barrington, 2018).
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creation of a federal Rojava, which covers the territory controlled by SDF, without the consent of the SDC.5 
Both co-leaders of the SDC rejected the PYD/YPG move toward a Kurdish-controlled federal province in 
Northern Syria. In the wake of this move, Manna stated: “I withdrew on March 19 from the presidency of 
the SDC and made it clear that I will not return until they rescind the March 17 declaration [the proclaimed 
 federalism]” (Arafat, 2016e, para. 3). Afterwards, Manna withdrew altogether from the SDC in the beginning 
of April 2016 (“Syrian opposition figure,” 2016). To have a key ally’s political branch of a supposedly multi-
ethnic military alliance excluded from such an important decision serves as an example of how powerful an 
actor the PYD in fact is, and how it has the ability to circumvent any member in SDC if it conflicts with PYD’s 
key interests. The SDF however, continued its missions as if this power struggle never took place, suggesting 
that it still is a strong multi-ethnic, independent force. However, as the data above shows, decision-making in 
the SDF adheres to the interests of the PYD and therefore cannot be separated from PYD’s strategy. Therefore, 
as Raqqa fell to a force led by SDF, it naturally became part of PYD’s political project for Northern Syria. Turkey 
was naturally concerned about the Kurdish expansion and the leverage the Kurds could gain in a post-conflict 
Syria (Bendix, 2017; Said, 2017a).
In 2017, the SDF enjoyed a high degree of international legitimacy through its pluralistic approach and 
acceptance of fighters into its ranks. Turkey on the other hand does not differentiate between YPG and SDF. 
The latter is most likely the reason why the US only have supplied SDF with light weapons and been cautious 
to supply heavy and advanced weapons (Strack, 2015). After the US airdropped the first weapons supply to 
SDF in October 2015, the US ambassador to Turkey was summoned to the Turkish foreign ministry to provide 
an explanation (Idiz, 2015). US State Department spokesperson John Kirby stated on October 14 that the US 
understands Turkey’s concern about the YPG and respects this concern, but as the US’s key priority in Syria was 
to counter ISIS, the US will continue to appropriately support the groups that are fighting effectively against 
ISIS inside Syria (Kirby, 2015). This resulted in Erdoğan officially expressing his continued concern and in 
February 2016, he among other things blamed US arms used by Syrian Kurds for a deadly bomb in Ankara 
that killed 28 people (“Turkey says US arms,” 2016). Ankara seems to have taken the US up on its stated main 
reason to continue its support of SDF as an effective force against ISIS by providing the US with an alternative 
ground force to counter ISIS though operation “Euphrates Shield.” An alternative force that the US so far has 
refused to rely on solely. The US has instead continued and expanded its operational alliance with the SDF 
under President Donald Trump (De Young, Ryan, & Gibbons-Neff, 2017).
When analyzing the SDF and SDC statements and moves, it should be viewed through the lenses of a heavy 
PYD/YPG influence, and the primary goal of realizing democratic autonomy in Rojava (Demirel, 2016a; Soz, 
2016). A YPG officer in Hasaka told IHS Jane’s that “the Kurdish idea is not acceptable to the world, so it’s  better 
to show that there are others here, so if people want to help Syria, they are not helping Kurds alone” (Spyer, 
2016, p. 2). This statement should be seen in the light of the historical deprivation of the Kurdish people’s 
 possibility to seek Kurdish statehood in the Middle East. In Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, the Kurds have never 
achieved self-determination and have had to take action and demand their rights and culture. It is very unlikely 
that an external nation such as the US, which cooperates with one of the four countries with a large Kurdish 
minority population, could speak out in support of Kurdish self-determination without grim reactions from 
one of these nations. It would be seen as a threat to their sovereignty. According to the YPG officer, the creation 
of SDF as an umbrella organization, which frames the Kurdish idea of self-determination as a group of different 
ethnic groups declaring self-determination would, allows nations sympathetic to the Kurdish cause to speak 
and act for their rights and arm them in their fight against ISIS.
Rojava Proclaims Federalism
On March 17 2016, the PYD and its allies surprised the world by announcing a new Federation of  Northern 
Syria, which would include the Kurdish territory of Rojava (the three Kurdish cantons) and the territory 
 captured by the YPG and SDF over the last year leading up to the announcement, including the Arab towns 
Shaddadi and Tal Abyad (Salih, 2016; “Syrian Kurds officially declare,” 2016; van Wilgenburg, 2016f). If imple-
mented, this would effectively turn the three cantons and captured Arab territory into a single federal system 
with a population of around 4 million people (Spencer, 2016; Taştekin, 2016a). A PYD representative in the 
 5 The proclamation of Federal Rojava and Northern Syria will be described in depth in the next chapter.
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UK insisted their intention was to be “part of future democratic, federal Syria” (Goudsouzian & Fatah, 2016, 
para. 14) and not to declare full independence. Representative delegates from the new federation’s territory 
elected a council of 31 members to draft the plans to effectively implement the Democratic Federal System 
for Rojava and Northern Syria (Spencer, 2016). The council faced complex issues, such as drawing up borders, 
the structure of public institutions, quotas for ethnic groups, regulations, and women’s role (Taştekin, 2016a). 
To represent Rojava, Hediya Yousef, a Kurd, was elected along with Mansur Selam, an Arab from Tal Abyad, 
to represent Northern Syria as co-leaders of the Federation (van Wilgenburg, 2016g). The Federation was 
 designated to be a non-ethnic project, which would include Arabs and Christians among other ethnicities in 
its leadership as the Rojava cantons did (Salih, 2016; Spencer, 2016; van Wilgenburg, 2014). The idea of feder-
alism contained the vision of a model for a decentralized government throughout the whole country of Syria 
( Barnard, 2016). The territorial lines of this federation differs from the classical understanding as stated by 
Salih Muslim, co-leader of PYD, the strongest party in the Federation:
There is no autonomous Kurdish regions, so there is no question of recognizing it or not. It is part of a 
democratic Syria… We want to decentralize Syria… The federalism we talk about is not a geographic line. 
Maybe tomorrow it’s going to be expanded into IS-controlled Raqqa and other places.
(van Wilgenburg, 2016f, para. 5, 7)
This clearly underlines the PYD’s wish for a decentralized and federal Syria, but more importantly it rejects the 
idea that this move is to create a transnational Kurdistan.
The federal proclamation was announced parallel to the third round of the Geneva-talks6 and was most likely 
a calculated strategic choice aimed at influencing its outcome. PYD has on several occasions not been invited to 
initiatives by the international community to end the Syrian crisis through peace negotiations (Miles & Irish, 
2016). PYD is most likely not invited to the Geneva talks due to opposition from Turkey. However, PYD and 
SDF have also been left out of opposition group talks in Riyadh due to various opposition groups  accusing 
them of being allies of the Assad government (Çandar, 2016; “Syria conflict: Government rejects,” 2016; “Syria 
conflict: Kurds declare,” 2016). As previously discussed, YPG has clashed violently several times with the 
 opposition, and a PYD-party official said in 2015 in relation to the Riyadh talks: “We’re not concerned with 
the output from the Riyadh conference, and we will act like it never happened” (Khodr, 2015, para. 29). The 
 continuous exclusion of PYD and SDF from the international peace talks has most likely affected how the 
group has thought about realizing their political goals.
In the initiative to solve the Gordian knot for a political solution for the Syrian conflict in Geneva, it seems 
unsustainable and to some extent unwise that the Syrian Kurdish party of KNC officially representing the Kurds 
 6 The Geneva Talks are a UN initiative to end the Syrian conflict.
Map 2: Northern Syria – Rojava Region, Archive: RDDC.
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Responses to the Democratic Federal System for Rojava and Northern Syria
KNC (Syria) KNC is not against a federal model for the Syrian Kurds, but as President of KNC, Ibrahim Biro, said 
in an interview: “The problem is not if we not unite on federalism or not, the problem is that they [PYD] 
don’t accept to work together; they want to rule by themselves” (van Wilgenburg, 2016f, para. 32). Further 
Kamiran Hajo, chairman of the Foreign Relations Office of the KNC said: “Announcing federalism all 
of a sudden, lacking the urgently needed debate and democratic participation to possibly come to that 
decision, is just another form of dictatorship” (KNC Geneva Office, 2016d, para. 3) These statements 
further underline the continued disunity between the PYD and KNC.
KRG The KRG government is taking a pragmatic approach in giving official statements on this issue due 
to its close economic relations with Turkey, who naturally is hostile towards the move (Goudsouzian 
& Fatah, 2016). KRG is backing the KNC who has shown great dissatisfaction with PYD’s unilateral 
proclamation of Federalism, and the Iraqi KRG president Barzani has stated: “There must be consensus 
on this among the Syrians themselves. When we declared federalism in the Kurdistan region, we didn’t 
do it unilaterally” (Zaman, 2016, para. 40). This response indicates support for federalism, but reluctance 
against a federation controlled by PYD.
US At a daily press briefing on March 16, Deputy spokesperson for the State Department, Mark Toner, stated 
in a response to a question about a federal state in Syria: “I would just say we’ve been very clear that we 
won’t recognize any kind of self-autonomous – or self-rule, semi-autonomous zones in Syria” (Toner, 
2013, para. 184).
Russia Russian deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said according to Reuters that Syria could become a 
federal state if that model would “serve the task of preserving Syria as a united, secular, independent 
and sovereign nation” (Tsvetkova & Solovyov, 2016, para. 4). It is doubtful that Russia would risk further 
deterioration of its relations with Turkey by supporting it (van Wilgenburg, 2016c).
Turkey A Turkish Foreign Ministry official has rejected the move and has stated: “Syria’s national unity and 




The regime regards the federalism project as unlawful and something that could provoke a collapse of the 
country’s northern regions. According to PYD, they have had several clashes with the regime in Qamishli 
after proclaiming the federal project, reflecting its concern (“Kurdish declaration of federalism,” 2016).
The 
Opposition
President of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and opposition Forces (NC) – Anas Al-Abdah 
said:
No party or any single component can take such a unilateral decision as the right to do so is 
owned by Syrian people as a whole. One of the primary goals of the Syrian revolution is to enable 
the Syrian people to freely decide the shape of their country without influence from any side. 
(National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, 2016, para. 2)
Munzir Aqbeeq from the SNC has stated:
Steps taken by one party alone are unacceptable to the opposition, and are considered illegal. 
We do not recognize it, especially since this party controls a geographical area by force of arms, 
 ruling by fait accompli without the need to obtain popular acceptance. (“Syrian Opposition 
Warns,” 2016, para. 2)
Riad Hajib, the head of the main Syrian opposition group in Geneva, High Negotiations Committee, 
stated: “Syria’s unity is a redline. This issue is non-negotiable and the idea of federalism is the prelude to 
the partitioning of Syria” (“Syria’s main opposition,” 2016, para. 2).
SDC Co-leader Haytham Manna has stated, “One party within the SDC [the PYD] undertook this initiative 
separately, adding that the regional declaration contravened the aims of the SDC” (Barrington, 2016, 
para. 7). Manna responded by resigning from his post in objection causing the Kurdish-Arab alliance to 
lose a large part of its Arab political block. 
Table 5: Responses to the Democratic Federal System for Rojava and Northern Syria.
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is at the negotiation table on the side of the opposition in the High Negotiation Committee. As shown above, 
KNC has a relatively weak representation of the Northern Syrian Kurds compared to, e.g., PYD. From a wider 
perspective, it therefore becomes clearer why the PYD took the unilateral action of proclaiming  federalism. 
PYD has been systematically left out of the negotiation rounds and has clashed militarily with parts of the Arab 
opposition to Assad. The Syrian actors have, through their unwillingness to invite PYD and SDF to the nego-
tiation rounds, failed to recognize its power on the ground while instead inviting KNC, which has no military 
presence in Rojava to represent the Kurds in Syria. This left PYD with few options in a hostile environment 
due to the bloody civil war to realize its political project. The unilateral decision of PYD to carry out its politi-
cal visions for Rojava and Northern Syria should therefore be understood in this context and as one of the last 
options, after having failed to be recognized as a legitimate actor due to regional power struggles.
Below are perceptions from key actors in the Syrian crisis to the declaration of federalism. Many of the actors 
directly reject it and show resentment for the action underlining the tension and resentment between the actors 
and how far there still is to go in a post-conflict Syria.
It should be stressed that the SDF is a vital and effective ally in combating ISIS and has retaken vast parts of 
the territory conquered by ISIS. However, the SDF advances near Azaz and the Euphrates River in 2016 appear 
largely to serve the goal of uniting the Federation with its enclave of Afrin. When SDF forces in February 2016 
liberated the town of Al Shaddadi in Northeastern Syria, thereby freeing the region of Hasakah from ISIS, the 
same seemed to be the case. To further exemplify this, a statement from US General Votel in March 2016 can 
be applied. He stated that there currently was no plan to take the ISIS capital of Raqqa (Committee on Armed 
Services, 2016; Miste, 2016). which again emphasizes the fact that the main objective of SDF not necessarily 
coincided or was coordinated with the US and the coalition.
Supporting the SDF with weapons, military advisors, and airstrikes without addressing the asymmetrical power 
relationship between the Kurdish and other ethnicities could undermine SDF’s ability to act autonomously of a 
PYD/YPG agenda. As described above, YPG is the backbone of SDF. A stronger SDF would most likely be applied 
by PYD as an asset to pursue Kurdish political goals while fighting ISIS. Supporting SDF therefore entails a high 
likelihood of empowering the PYD/YPG in realizing their main political objective of autonomy.
With this is mind, decision makers should take into consideration some of the likely side effects that strong 
support for SDF most definitely will have.
Reported Affiliation between PKK and PYD/YPG
The following section sets out to analyze and discuss the alleged affiliation between the PKK and the PYD/
YPG. The alleged affiliation is one of the main components in the deteriorating relationship between Turkey 
and the US and it potentially has major implications for the continued US and European support to the PYD. 
The armed conflict between PKK and Turkey has recently resurged and because Turkey lists PKK and PYD 
as the same organization they are fighting both groups. While the US and Europe support PYD’s fight against 
ISIS they also list PKK as a terror organization. The struggle over the affiliation is therefore essential as the 
 consequences of the US recognizing the affiliation would most likely result in the US having to cut official 
ties and list PYD alongside PKK as a terror organization. This is summed up in a statement by Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan back in 2014:
At the moment, the PYD is equal with the PKK for us. It is also a terrorist organization. It would be very 
wrong for America – with whom we are allies and who we are together with in NATO – to expect us to say 
‘yes’ after openly announcing such support for a terrorist organization.
(“President Erdoğan says PYD,” 2014, para. 3).
The relationship between a faction of the Syrian Kurds, who would move on to form the political organization 
of PYD, and the Turkish Kurdish political organization of PKK has its origins in the 1980s. PKK and its leader 
and founding member, Abdullah Öcalan, were allowed by then Syrian President Hafez Assad to establish bases 
from where they could plan and coordinate military operations into Turkey from Northern Syria (near Afrin). 
This was due to a territorial dispute between Syria and Turkey over the Hatay region, a dispute that escalated 
when Turkey started building a dam on the Euphrates River in the 1980s, which threatened part of Syria’s water 
reserves (International Crisis Group, 2014).
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In 1998, Turkey accused Syria of using terrorism, through the PKK’s attacks in Turkey, to wage an “ undeclared 
war.” This led Turkey to threaten Syria with war unless the country did not ban and halt every form of support 
for the PKK. The threat led Syria to expel Öcalan, ban the PPK, and dismantle its bases in Syria (International 
Crisis Group, 2014; Kurdwatch, 2013; Steele, 2015). Many of the PKK fighters then moved to Northern Iraq 
while Öcalan took up exile in Kenya. In 1999, he was captured in a joint US-Turkish operation and is presently 
serving a lifetime sentence in Turkey (Makovsky, 1999; Steele, 2015).
During the almost two decades of PKK in Syria, the Turkish Kurdish movement influenced and mobilized a 
faction of Syrian Kurds to sympathize with their movement. This culminated in 2003 when PYD was  established 
as a Syrian political branch of PKK, in an attempt to establish an organizational forum for the Syrian Kurdish 
sympathizers in the aftermath of the banning of PKK (Charountaki, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2014; 
Kurdwatch, 2013; Mansour, 2015). The PYD established itself as a Kurdish movement during the  Qamishli 
anti-government uprisings in 2004, which led to a brutal response from the Syrian regime (International Crisis 
Group, 2014; Kurdwatch, 2009). This drastically weakened the PYD in the years to come until the massive 
uprising in 2011 (often referred to as the Arab Spring in a regional context) presented a new opportunity for a 
revival (Charountaki, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2014).
Amidst the Syrian conflict, the Syrian Government by and large withdrew its armed forces from the Kurdish 
areas in the North. The withdrawal presented an opportunity, which was seized by the PYD and its armed wing, 
YPG. PYD quickly established itself as the dominant Kurdish party in the region, controlling and governing 
large areas of land through the Tev-Dem (Movement for a Democratic Society) and allies (Kurdwatch, 2013). 
The Tev-Dem was set up as an inclusive model of decentralized administration in Rojava to fill the governance 
vacuum left by the Syrian Government’s withdrawal. Syrian Kurdish opposition parties, such as the KNC, have 
criticized the Tev-Dem for being governed in an authoritarian fashion by PYD, with its governance model 
having strong ties to PYD’s ideology (Sary, 2016, p. 11). The intra-Kurdish rivalry between the various Syrian 
Kurdish parties to govern through the Tev-Dem, and PYD’s success in securing its dominance of the governing 
body, will be elaborated in the following chapters. But first, the importance of PYD and PKK relations must 
be investigated further. According to a Kurdwatch7 report, the PYD was able to become the strongest Syrian 
Kurdish actor. This was enabled by a strong military core of PKK-trained cadres (Kurdwatch, 2013). Secondary 
literature affirms this, with several scholars arguing that PYD could not have set up the logistics for its civilian 
and military components without receiving assistance from the PKK (Bradley & Parkinson, 2015; Wimmen 
& Selcuk, 2013). Furthermore, multiple sources have reported that PKK fighters are fighting ISIS alongside 
YPG, and in some instances are even undertaking command positions within the YPG’s forces (Cagaptay & 
Unal, 2014; Charountaki, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2014; Kurdwatch, 2013; Lister & Ward, 2015; Steele, 
2015). Some reports also inform of YPG fighters receiving training at PKK camps in Iraqi Kurdistan’s Qandil 
Mountains. These reports speak of a deep involvement from PKK in the internal ranks of YPG, which could 
translate into large influence on Syrian Kurdish politics (International Crisis Group, 2014; Stein, 2016). The 
Atlantic Council has investigated the YPG’s self-reported data for casualties and found that almost 50% were 
Turkish Kurds killed fighting ISIS in Syria, which strongly indicates that there is a firm link between Turkish 
Kurds and military engagement in the Syrian conflict (Stein & Foley, 2016). At a specific event, this was further 
underlined in 2014, during ISIS encirclement of the Syrian Kurdish city of Kobane when PKK stated on their 
official website: “The youth of Northern Kurdistan (Southeast Turkey) should go to Kobane (Ayn al-Arab) and 
take part in the historic, honorable resistance” (“PKK calls on Turkish Kurds,” 2014, para. 3). In continuation of 
this, a Kurdish fighter has also stated to the Wall Street Journal: “Sometimes I’m a PKK, sometimes I’m a PJAK, 
sometimes I’m an YPG. It doesn’t really matter. They are all members of the PKK” (Bradley & Parkinson, 2015, 
para. 20).
In a more individual context, the link was illuminated when PYD’s current co-president, Salih Muslim, was 
arrested in 2004 during the Qamishli uprisings, and when subsequently released he went to a PKK camp in the 
Qandil Mountains. He returned in 2011 to take part in the initial anti-regime protests in Syria (International 
Crisis Group, 2014; Kurdwatch, 2013; Steele, 2015). Salih Muslim stated in an interview with Rudaw in response 
to PKK and PYD affiliation that “there existed no direct link between the PKK and his party” but merely a link 
“on an intellectual level” (“We embrace the ideals,” 2016, para. 3). The PYD is currently  implementing their 
 7 Kurdwatch is a project of ”European Center for Kurdish Studies” a private research institution based in Berlin (European Center for 
Kurdish Studies, 2017)
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version of PKK leader Öcalan’s ideology, known as ‘democratic autonomy.’ The PYD is very open about their 
shared ideological link with the PKK. A closer look at PYD’s implementation of democratic autonomy in Syria 
shows that PYD’s implementation is more pragmatic and adjusted to the Syrian context than what is the case 
with PKK’s description of democratic autonomy. This is presumably because the Syrian Kurds have had to be 
more in tune with the larger multi-ethnic conflict environment in Syria to enhance their chances of success 
(Charountaki, 2015; Drott, 2014).
The ideological link between the PKK and the PYD was institutionalized by the PYD’s membership of the 
Union of Communities in Kurdistan Koma Civakên Kurdistan (KCK). The KCK is an umbrella organization 
operating under the leadership of Öcalan, and according to IHS Jane’s, the KCK is the political wing of PKK and 
its legislative assembly, the People’s Congress of Kurdistan, located in the Qandil Mountains (Iraqi  Kurdistan). 
The PYD is a member of the KCK along with PKK and other Kurdish groups from Iraq and Iran (Cagaptay & 
Unal, 2014; International Crisis Group, 2014; Kurdwatch, 2013; MacDonald, 2014). At a PYD conference in 
2015, the co-leadership read out a message from the KCK stating:
PYD must get organized very well by strengthening and extending its democratic system. It must ensure a 
strong organization of all its cadres, workers and labourers under the umbrella of TEV-DEM
(“KCK message to PYD,” 2015, para. 5).
The statement above serves as an example of the ideological link between PYD and PKK, and it also shows 
the level of the relationship between the parties and their joint commitment to implement their shared 
ideology.
The KCK therefore serves as an organizational link between the PYD and PKK in regard to their common 
political goals. While this only sustains the idea of an ideological link, other actors engaged in Syria point at a 
much greater integration and coordination than the statements by Salih Muslim indicates.
International Actors’ Positions toward the Syrian Kurdish Groups
Based on the above analysis of the alleged affiliation between the PKK and the PYD, the different positions of 
the most influential international actors that are engaged in Syria towards this alleged affiliation are analyzed 
below. The section provides an overview of official statements from Russia, Turkey, Iran, US, the EU, and KRG.
Russia’s relationship with the Syrian Kurds improved after Turkey downed a Russian jet in November 2015, 
thus enabling the two big powers to pursue what could be labeled as a Syrian-Kurdish proxy-war (Tisdall, 
2016). In late May 2016, Turkish President Erdoğan accused the Russians of having supplied the PKK with anti-
aircraft guns and missiles through Iraq and Syria, a claim Russia rejected. Russia, for its part, accused Turkey 
of hindering the Syrian Kurdish armed force of YPG in its battle against ISIS (Coskun & Toksabay, 2016). The 
deteriorating relationship between Turkey and Russia showed signs of mending when Erdoğan in late June 
2016 sent an official apology for the downing of the Russian jet to Putin. Erdoğan hoped for a normalization of 
the relationship and reminded Putin of the potential for regional cooperation. The apology came at a time when 
the Turkish economy had been hit hard by the Russian sanctions and the Turkish-backed opposition in Syria 
was being weakened by the Syrian Government’s advances near Aleppo, supported by Russian airstrikes (Sly, 
2016; Stubbs & Solovyov, 2016). Erdoğan’s hope for normalization between the two countries seems to have 
been realized because Putin, at a bilateral meeting with Erdoğan in May 2017, described the Russo-Turkish 
ties since 2015 as “getting back to a normal cooperative partnership” (Pinchuk, Ostroukh, & Soldatkin, 2017, 
para. 4). This rapprochement could limit or end the Russian support for PYD, ending a powerful actor who 
has spoken in support of the possibilities for a federal state in post-civil-war Syria. If Russia withdraws its sup-
port to the PYD, it would undermine the historically cooperative relationship between Russia and the Kurdish 
ambition for a nation state, along with the possible strong role of Russia in advancing Kurdish federalism in a 
post-conflict Syria. Russia could still in the near future step up its support for PYD if bilateral relations with 
Turkey deteriorate. This would serve as an attractive option for the PYD (Grove & Kesling, 2016). However, the 
new policy towards PYD by Russia after the rapprochement with Turkey has yet to be formalized, but  Russia 
will most likely have to specify its Middle Eastern policy once the Syrian civil war ends, i.e., whether it will 
support Syrian Kurdish federalism or side with the regime and Turkey’s outright rejection of Syrian Kurdish 
autonomy (van Wilgenburg, 2017). The Russo-Turkish relationship’s impact on PYD’s opportunities as a small 
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actor on the global scene seems to serve as an example of how the internal policies within the regional powers 
engaged in a conflict can have unforeseen consequences for the Syrian actors on the ground in the civil war.
The Iranian-Kurdish history is important to include briefly as the current Iranian Government struggles with 
rising discontent in its Kurdish population. After being brutally repressed by the Shah, it was neglected by the 
subsequent theocratic regime under Ayatollah Khomeini. Kurdish political parties in Iran remain outlawed; 
Kurdish areas are underdeveloped and poor; and according to Middle East Eye, political activists are routinely 
jailed and tortured. The situation in Iran could spark an uprising if not carefully managed by the Iranian 
Government (Neuhof, 2016; Zaman, 2015). To understand Iran’s position vis-à-vis the PYD in Syria and its 
alleged affiliation with PKK, Iran and PKK’s shifting cooperation must be taken into consideration. The Iran-
PKK relationship has gone from warm to cold. According to an article by Michael Rubin at the Washington 
Institute, Iran has used PKK to undermine Turkish and US influence in the region (Rubin, 2003). Especially 
during the Iran-Iraq war, Iran sought to benefit from supporting the PKK to disrupt the Kirkuk pipeline and 
to help Iranian intelligence operations in Iraq (Kardas, 2009). In return, Iran provided weapons and a logisti-
cal framework. After the Iran-Iraq war, Iran was concerned with the growing PKK influence on Iran’s own 
large Kurdish minority and sought to limit their level of influence. The relationship thereafter grew hostile 
and the Iranian Kurdish political group Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), was formed in 2004 as an offshoot of 
the PKK. PJAK resides in the Iraqi Kurdistan Qandil Mountains along with PKK, but Iran is its main area of 
operations (Bruno, 2007; Kardas, 2009; “U.S. brands PKK’s,” 2009). The Iranian Army cracked down on PJAK 
in 2011. Hundreds of its members were killed, forcing PJAK to sign a cease-fire agreement (Zaman, 2015). The 
historical tensions combined with the rivalry with Turkey could be the reason why it is very difficult to find 
official statements from the Iranian Government about the alleged link between PKK and PYD. Iranian views 
and or support for the PKK-PYD affiliation are most likely balanced due to the desire for maintaining a good 
 relationship with Russia.
The Syrian regime’s policy of not commenting officially on the alleged PKK presence in Syria is most likely 
in order to avoid further escalating its conflict with Turkey and because the regime’s policy towards the Kurds 
is constrained by its alliance with Russia. In 1998, Turkey was ready to go to war with Syria in order to disrupt 
PKK’s safe haven there. Turkey was outspoken in its support for the Syrian opposition and demand of Syrian 
president Bashar al-Assad’s resignation. At the time of writing, the Syrian regime has no strategic advantages in 
officially recognizing or addressing the issue of PKK presence in Northern Syria.
The European Union has PKK on its list of terrorist organizations while the European External Action Ser-
vice had stated nothing officially about the PYD by the end of 2017. In January 2016, the European group GUE/
NGL8 held a conference on the EU, Turkey, and the Kurds to which it had invited Saleh Muslim, PYD, and 
Reward Resid, co-president of KNK, to participate (GUE/NGL, 2016a). The minutes of the conference show a 
very critical stance toward Turkey by the European Parliamentary group GUE/NGL and a request by the Euro-
pean group for the EU to mediate the conflict (GUE/NGL, 2016b). The EU’s non-commenting on the alleged 
PYD-PKK affiliation appears to align with the US by listing the PKK as a terrorist group while not affiliating 
it with the PYD. An explanation could be that the European External Action Service strives to work by con-
sensus, which complicates matters when 28 governments have to officially agree on complicated conflicts with 
various interests present (European Union External Action, 2016).
While the EU’s official statements towards the Syrian Kurds have been vague, PYD has launched public 
campaigns within the individual European countries to gain legitimacy and support for their cause despite 
fierce protests from Turkey (Taştekin, 2015, 2016c). In April 2015, they opened an office in Prague with Czech 
governmental representatives present (Taştekin, 2016c; van Wilgenburg, 2016i). A year later, they opened an 
office in Stockholm (Kart, 2016). According to Zuhat Kobani, the PYD representative to Europe, the Euro-
pean countries de facto recognize Rojava by allowing PYD to open offices even though the countries officially 
abstain from doing so (Taştekin, 2016c). The most recent opening of a PYD office in Paris was followed by the 
Turkish president, Erdoğan, urging European countries to stop allowing PYD to open offices, arguing it would 
encourage attacks against the Turkish people residing in European countries as well as within Turkey itself 
(“Turkey calls on EU,” 2016; “Turkey urges European,” 2016).
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PYD’s and PKK’s ideological link serves as a strong bond between the two organizations. Their organiza-
tional ties and affiliations are in all cases very complicated. Even though they are both part of the KCK, this 
link does not in itself provide sufficient evidence to make the conclusion of a present, direct organizational 
affiliation between the PKK and PYD. The US, EU, Russia, and Iran have in stark contrast to Turkey and KRG 
President Barzani not publicly linked PYD and PKK as the same organizations. The EU’s and US’s continued 
support for PYD/YPG, through the Syrian Democratic Forces, is dependent on a clear distinction between the 
two organizations, since PKK figures on the list of terrorist organizations in both places. Turkey’s demand to 
the US and EU to withdraw support for PYD/YPG due to Turkey’s claim that PYD/YPG are the same organi-
zation as PKK, is limiting US and EU options for action while at the same time providing an opportunity for 
Russia and the Syrian Regime to seek influence within PYD. However, the sources cited above more than sug-
gest that PYD and PKK have a very strong sympathy for each other and largely share the same ideology and 
political objective of democratic autonomy. Reports on fighters from PKK fighting alongside PYD in Syria 
sustain the argument that the affiliation is not limited to sympathy. Furthermore, taking history into considera-
tion with the PYD being founded by PKK along with the above, indications of organizational links and even 
 coordination seems very likely.
Finally, the international actors’ views on this matter are greatly influenced by their interests and alliances in 
the Syrian war, which provide an incentive, especially for the US and the EU, to avoid even raising questions of 
the likely organizational linkage. If a clear argument was present with regard to determining that such a linkage 
was not present, it would most likely have been stated officially as part of an answer to a NATO ally’s concern. 
An overview of the main international actors’ views on the affiliation is provided in the table below.
 9 However, on June 15, 2018 the European Union External Action responded to a petition expressing its fears about the negative 
consequences of the operation launched by Turkey against the PYD (Ferrer, 2018).
International Actors’ Official Views on the Alleged Affiliation between the PYD and PKK
Turkey Turkey has expressed harshly that it regards PYD/YPG as an offshoot terror organization of the PKK 
(“Turkey’s Erdogan denounces US,” 2016).
KRG In an interview with Al Monitor, in response to whether PYD and PKK are the same, the President of the 
KRG, Barzani, said “they are exactly one and the same thing” (Zaman, 2016, para. 46).
US In a response to the affiliation between the PYD and PKK, Mark Toner, Deputy spokesperson of the US 
State Dept., stated that the US, “still view this as two separate entities.” (Toner, 2013)
Russia “Neither the PKK nor the PYD are considered terrorist organizations by either Russia or the United Nations 
Security Council” (Saeed, 2015, para. 2), Andrew Karlov, the Russian ambassador to Ankara stated. Russia 
refers to both actors as legitimate, according to The Guardianv (Tisdall, 2016). The Kurds have for more 
than 200 years played an important role in Russia’s wars with Qajar Persia and Ottoman Turkey (Reynolds, 
2016; Tabler & Cagaptay, 2016). Russia’s position on the PKK/PYD affiliation should be seen in light of 
Kurdish and Russian cooperation historically.
Iran According to Anadolu Agency in February 2016, the Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson Hossein Jabari 
Ansari has abstained from calling PYD a terrorist organization, even when prompted (“Iran’s ministry 
abstains,” 2016). While no official statements on Iran banning PKK was found, Iran has banned all Kurdish 
political parties including PKK’s offshoot PJAK (Neuhof, 2016). 
Syrian 
Regime
The Syrian regime has been very quiet on the alleged affiliation between the PKK and PYD. In 2012, Gönül 
Tol found that the Syrian Regime is well aware and tolerates the alleged affiliation between PKK and PYD 
due to a mutual interest in destabilizing Turkey (Tol, 2012a). 
EU PKK is on the European Union’s list of terror organizations (Council of the European Union, 2013). A search 
on PYD at the European Union External Action webpage yielded no results as of 2017.9 Syrian Kurdish 
actors are only mentioned in a statement showing deep concern for their security and the humanitarian 
situation in Kobane (European Union External Action, 2014).
Table 6: International Actors’ Official Views on the Alleged Affiliation between the PYD and PKK.
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Likely Side Effects from Continued/Enhanced Support to the SDF
As the previous sections of this part of the book have demonstrated, SDF has been the preferred partner of the 
US and European countries in the fight against ISIS. However, there are certain potential negative side effects 
of this strategy. These are discussed below.
Provoking Turkey
An alarming side effect in supporting SDF could be that the SDF (and thereby YPG) advances its territorial 
gains along the Turkish border between the regions of Afrin and Kobane and attacks Turkish-backed groups 
amidst the advances. This would trigger even more hostile reactions from Turkey. Turkey’s relationship with 
PYD/YPG has grown hostile over the last years as PYD through YPG and SDF has continued to seize more 
 territory near the Turkish border and has violated the “red line” (the Azaz-Jarabulus line) near the Euphrates 
River set up by Turkey in pursuit of preventing a unification of the three Kurdish cantons. After the YPG/SDF 
crossed this line, Turkey initiated a military response in terms of shelling Kurdish positions in the province 
of Aleppo, near Azaz, and near the Euphrates River to stop the advances (Aboudadel, 2016; Nissenbaum & 
Dagher, 2016; Pamuk, 2015; Perry, 2016b; Rifai, 2016; “Turkish army ready,” 2016; “YPG says it has crossed,” 
2016). After the liberation of Manbij by SDF fighters, Turkey scaled up its response from shelling to direct 
military action into Syria, largely motivated by the seemingly unceasing advance by the SDF near its border.
Turkey’s actions should be viewed from in a long-term perspective, where a Kurdish-dominated entity in 
Syria could fuel further and intensified separatist ambitions among Turkey’s Kurdish population, facilitate arms 
 smuggling, and serve as a safe haven for PKK insurgents (Nissenbaum & Dagher, 2016; Seckin & Ali, 2016; 
Spencer, 2016). As mentioned earlier, Turkey regards PYD/YPG as terrorists and does not differentiate between 
PKK and PYD (and SDF, for that matter) (Ergan, 2016). Erdoğan has on several occasions called for the US 
to put the PYD/YPG on the terrorist list alongside PKK, but so far without any result. In February 2016, this 
resulted in the following statement from the Turkish President to the US: “Are you on our side or the side of the 
terrorist PYD and PKK organization?” (“Turkey’s Erdogan denounces US,” 2016, para. 14). It is of course  obvious 
that the statement draws parallels to former US President George W. Bush’s statements in the wake of 9/11.
Turkey is objecting to the newly proclaimed Rojava and Northern Syria Federalism and is concerned with 
the high number of YPG fighters in SDF (Idiz, 2016). The US support to SDF and the NATO alliance with 
Turkey has led the US to denounce Turkey’s shelling of SDF forces while at the same time urging the Syrian 
Kurds not to expand their area of operation (Nissenbaum, 2016; “Turkey v Syria’s Kurds,” 2016). Turkey still 
seeks to empower local Arab tribes, who are not aligned to the Kurds, to advance against ISIS and continues to 
ask the US to drop support of YPG/SDF (Taştekin, 2016b). This Turkish strategy was strongly enhanced during 
Operation “Euphrates Shield”, when FSA and the Turkish Army took Jarablus, and after a prolonged campaign 
against Al Bab among other ISIS strongholds (Zaman, 2017). Turkey thereby presented the US with an on-the-
ground alternate force to SDF for countering ISIS. The US rejection of Turkey’s proposal could be due to great 
power politics in the region. Russia does not wish to see a stronger Turkish presence in a post-conflict Syria due 
to Turkey’s role in supporting various opposition forces to the Syrian regime under Bashar al-Assad – Russia’s 
main ally in Syria. Several sources have also cast doubt on the effectiveness of the Turkish-backed fighters and 
the Turkish Army in combating ISIS in comparison to the SDF (Cockburn, 2017; Iddon, 2017; Tremblay, 2017). 
This could explain why the US is staying with SDF as the most efficient ground force to counter ISIS.
By supporting SDF, it can be argued that the West (primarily the US) has chosen a short-term approach to 
defeating ISIS, which apparently outweighs the interests of a key NATO ally in the region. However, at the 
same time, Turkey’s contribution to prioritize the fight against ISIS was at best very reluctant in the first years 
after the initial progress made by ISIS. However, the likelihood of Turkey launching a ground offensive or 
aerial strikes against Syrian Kurds, while SDF serves as an operational ally to the US in the fight against ISIS is 
estimated as low. This is also based on the continued potential of Russia to deter Turkey with the deployment 
of anti-aircraft missiles in Syria (Nissenbaum, Peker, & Marson, 2015; “Turkey’s downing,” 2015).  Additionally, 
the US and Russia have put pressure on Ankara to accept the PYD as a legitimate actor in the conflict – a 
request Turkey has ruled out (Yetkin, 2017). The danger of an escalated conflict between Turkey and SDF 
is very real and could go from cold to warm, which also was the case after ISIS was defeated in Raqqa (Gall, 
2018). If the US and Russia in a post-civil war scenario back down from their support for SDF or are ambiguous 
The Syrian Kurds 25
about its future recognition this will also most likely be followed by an escalation in warm conflicts between 
the  different actors within Syria.
Continued Western support in Post-conflict Syria: Further disrupting the Balance
Continued Western support for SDF is disrupting the balance of power in favor of the Kurdish federal solution 
in a post-conflict scenario in Syria. The Syrian Kurds will possess weapons, receive military training, and be 
able to boost their organization through financial and advisory support, which likely will result in  enhancing 
PYD and YPG confidence. There does not seem to be any incentive for neither the political party nor the 
 military group to relinquish gains made.
An agreement between the opposition and the regime without the consent of PYD is therefore highly 
unlikely to be implemented in Northern Syria if it reverses the Kurdish ambitions for Syrian federalism. To 
what extent the Syrian Kurds would be willing to defend Rojava and its autonomy against a new united Syrian 
state  structure is of course another question, which remains to be answered. However, no matter how or if a 
united post-conflict Syrian government is constituted, the question of Kurdish autonomy in Northern Syria will 
have to be dealt with from a Syrian state point of view. So far, PYD and YPG have showed a firm  willingness to 
pursue their political ambitions by proclaiming federalism even with various Syrian actors instantly rejecting it.
The developments on the ground have had profound implications for SDF’s course of action as their strategy 
of gaining territory from ISIS has been challenged by Turkey’s and Assad’s military advances. This is because 
the legitimacy and international support for SDF’s territorial advances in Syria have largely rested on SDF’s 
ability to act as “boots on the ground” for the US-led coalition against ISIS. Their territorial advances into ISIS 
territory near the Turkish border have been supported by Russia and the US amidst heavy Turkish  criticism 
of the latter and direct military actions to halt the SDF advance near the Euphrates River. With the  territory 
between the Kurdish cantons of Afrin and Kobane-controlled by the Syrian regime, a Russian ally, and  Turkey, 
a NATO ally, it seems highly unlikely that SDF can advance in this territory without meeting an array of 
unknown consequences for putting its two main operational allies Russia and the US between a rock and a 
hard place.
Turkey’s operation “Euphrates Shield” and the Syrian regime’s retake of Aleppo seems therefore to have put 
an end, for the time being, to PYD efforts through SDF to unite Afrin and Kobane without breaking away from 
their operational allies and putting themselves at risk of ending up completely isolated. Such a move could lead 
to the complete eradication of the political project of a federal Rojava by the stronger military powers of Turkey 
or the Syrian regime. This left the SDF to look south and to Raqqa with the oil-rich province of Deir al-Zor 
southeast of the city (Said, 2017b).
Looking a few years ahead, policy-makers must therefore keep in mind that perceiving the KNC as a 
 uniform Kurdish voice in negotiations would be ignorant. One example of this was the third round of Geneva 
 negotiations in 2016, where the KNC was invited as such a voice even though it was not representative of all, 
or even a majority, of the Syrian Kurds (van Wilgenburg, 2016d). In relation to the latter, PYD would definitely 
be a more legitimate and representative Kurdish organization. The two parties’ (KNC and PYD) relationship 
can actually be described as a rivalry in terms of aspiring for political control in Northern Syria and they do 
not appear to be cooperating in order to share political power. This is best shown through the fact that PYD 
and its allies have been confident enough to unilaterally declare federalism and implement their ideology of 
democratic self-administration to decentralize decision making to local democratic councils. In general, Syrian 
Kurds are split on these issues, but PYD is presently providing security and liberating Kurdish and Arab towns 
in Syria through its armed forces (YPG) and therefore seems to be the most appropriate representative in the 
conflict.
A NATO country (e.g. Denmark) that supports the SDF must therefore be prepared to face the same 
 dilemmas with which the US is struggling. On the one hand, a strategy to support SDF (de facto YPG) would 
support some of the most effective fighters and most likely ensure continued ground victories against ISIS. On 
the other hand, it would strengthen PYD’s regional power position and likelihood of realizing its political goal 
of federalism and democratic self-administration, which will not only face criticism in Ankara, but also lead to 
internal Kurdish and Kurdish-Arab conflicts and political power struggles in the post-ISIS Syria.

PART TWO
The Iraqi Kurdistan Region
In order to obtain an understanding of the influential actors within the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, this part 
 analyses in depth the alliances, capacities, and political objectives of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan,  Kurdistan 
 Democratic Party and Gorran (Movement for Change). In the following, the origins and internal dynamics of 
the Kurdish Regional Government are analyzed. The implications of the economic downfall of the region as 
well as the international fallout following the independence referendum are discussed in detail in this part.
The Origins of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and the KRG
The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) was established in 1991 when the Patriotic Union of  Kurdistan 
(PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) initiated an armed struggle against the Iraqi Army. The 
momentum was a Kurdish popular uprising in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s defeat in Kuwait the same 
year. After the Iraqi Army had defeated this rebellion, they threatened to repeat the 1988 crackdowns on the 
Iraqi Kurds, known as the Anfal campaign, where chemical weapons were used against Iraqi Kurds ( Haulman, 
2000). The campaign had resulted in an estimated killing of 180,000 Kurds, with about 4,000-5,000 killed by 
chemical weapons (Human Rights Watch, 1993; Kurdistan Regional Government, n.d.-a; Poole, 2006). In the 
face of this threat, hundreds of thousands Iraqi Kurds fled to the mountain slopes of the Iraqi-Turkish bor-
der, leading to a humanitarian crisis, which the US under a UN mandate helped avert by dropping tons of 
 humanitarian aid under operation “Provide Comfort.” The operation later expanded into the deployment of 
20,000 US and  coalition ground and air forces to ensure the security of the Iraqi Kurds from the Iraqi military. 
In the last phase of Operation “Provide Comfort,” US, British, French, and Turkish air power enforced a no 
fly-zone over  Kurdish territory in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq. The Turkish engage-
ment in this operation – besides from being a reaction to internal NATO pressure – was most likely to prevent 
thousands of Kurdish refugees to head for the border between Iraq and Turkey. If the crisis escalated, a heavy 
international pressure on Turkey to open its border for the refugees could have been an outcome. For internal 
security  purposes, Turkey most likely wanted to avoid such an outcome (Haulman, 2000).
The result was a complete withdrawal of the regime administration and soldiers from the Kurdish region, 
which de facto implemented Kurdish autonomy over the territory (Hassan, 2015). In the aftermath of the 
withdrawal, the Iraqi Kurds established a parliamentary system that held its first elections in 1992. After the 
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election, a power-sharing agreement between PUK and KDP took form. However, the implementation of the 
agreement struggled from the beginning concerning access to government posts and resources, which ignited 
an armed struggle between the two parties. This became the beginning of a deadly civil war within the Kurdish 
territory, which in the following years resulted in about 5,000 internal Kurdish casualties (Al-Khatteeb, 2015; 
International Crisis Group, 2015). The conflict reached its peak when the KDP invited the Iraqi Army to enter 
the no-fly zone and assist in ousting PUK forces from Erbil (Haulman, 2000; International Crisis Group, 2015; 
Lowrie & Blystone, 1996). The presence of the regime army in the no-fly zone forced the then US adminis-
tration under the leadership of Bill Clinton to enforce the no-fly zone and initiate “Operation Desert Strike,” 
where it launched 44 cruise missiles against the Iraqi air defense infrastructure, effectively halting further Iraqi 
military advances (Haulman, 2000). The Kurdish civil war ended in 1998, when the leaders of PUK, Jalal Tala-
bani, and KDP, Masoud Barzani, signed a peace agreement in Washington (“Iraqi Kurdistan profile,” 2017).
PUK shortly after established its own government institutions in Sulaymaniyah creating a competing set of 
governments and military institutions to the ones KDP had set up in Erbil. These separate government and 
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Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
Established In 1946 by Mustafa Barzani, the father of former KRG president Masoud Barzani (Kurdistan 
Democratic Party, n.d.).




Internal elections to choose their leadership (Kurdistan Democratic Party, 2010).
Leader: Masoud Barzani.
Armed Forces In Iraq, the armed Peshmerga forces are allegedly united under the KRG’s command. However, 
several accounts describe a split within the Peshmerga forces, which indicates that segments within 
the forces are first and foremost loyal to their party affiliation. KDP controls their party affiliated 
Peshmerga forces.
Political Goals To maintain their strong government position within the KRG. To seek independence from 
Baghdad: In September 2017, they organized and held a non-recognized referendum. Although 
93% voted in favor, the immediate actions taken by the Federal Government of Iraq to stop the 
referendum resulted in President Masoud Barzani stepping down and freezing the referendum 
results (Kurdistan Regional Government, 2017). 
Ideology A liberal constitutional democracy.
KDP is center-right.




Turkey: Before the KRG insisted on holding the independence referendum despite Turkish 
opposition their relationship was warm and strong. What followed in the aftermath of the 
referendum has been a cold relationship with Turkey aligning their policy along Baghdad on the 




PUK-KDP: The two parties were engaged in a strategic-agreement until the 2013 election, when 
they ran on separate lists.
KDP-Gorran: After Gorran’s landslide election in 2013, KDP and Gorran formed a coalition 
government, without signing a strategic-agreement similar to that of PUK and KDP. This was 
disrupted in October 2015, when KDP sacked minister posts held by Gorran.
Table 7: Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).
military institutions continued until the US mediated a joint regional government in Erbil after Saddam Hus-
sein was overthrown in 2003. However, according to several analysts and observers, the PUK and KDP kept 
their separate institutions and ran de facto parallel systems where party loyalty far outweighed the integration 
of their institutions (Abbas, 2013; Dalay, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2015).
The Kurdish Regional Government in Post-Saddam Iraq
From 2005, PUK and KDP shared the political power in KRG and in 2006, both parties agreed to unify their 
two separate administrations. The Kurdistan Region’s economy was booming from 2005-11 (heavily depend-
ent on the oil price) with foreign investments, double-digit growth, and a high employment rate (Shapland, 
2015). One of the largest economic trading partners for the KRG was and remains Turkey. Turkey has made 
substantial energy investments in the Kurdistan Region and the strong affiliation is exemplified by the fact that 
Iraq in 2014 was Turkey’s second biggest export market, with a large portion of exports going to the Kurdistan 
Region (“Islamic State: Why Turkey prefers,” 2014). According to a Washington Institute policy analysis, the 
area governed by KRG was Turkey’s third largest export market in 2013, with Turkish exports amounting to 
USD 8 billion, largely due to huge investment in the energy sector (Cagaptay, Fidan, & Sacikara, 2015).
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Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
Established In 1975 by Jalal Talabani.




Internal elections to choose their leadership (“PUK deputies announced,” 2016).
Leader: Jalal Talabani was the leader from 1975 until his death after a long struggle with illness in 
October 2017 (McDonald, 2017). The party is looking for new leadership (Pollack, 2016). 
Armed Forces In Iraq, the armed Peshmerga forces are allegedly united under the KRG’s command. However, 
several accounts describe a split within the Peshmerga force, which indicates that segments within 
the force are first and foremost loyal to their party affiliation. PUK controls their party affiliated 
Peshmerga forces.
Political Goals To regain its political power after Talabani’s death, which has caused PUK to lose a large portion of 
their voter share to Gorran.
Ideology A liberal constitutional democracy.
PUK is more left-wing leaning than KDP while supporting a market economy (“PUK: Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan,” n.d.).
Rivals Intra-Kurdish power struggle within the KRG: KDP/Gorran.
Alliances Iran, PKK and PYD (van Wilgenburg, 2013c).
Operative partners 
and alliances 
PUK-KDP: The two parties were engaged in a strategic-agreement until the 2013 election where 
they ran on separate list. Since then, the rivalry between the two parties has continued with two 
parties failing to agree on a common nomination for the Iraqi Presidency (a post reserved to a Kurd 
by the Iraqi constitution) (Ismaeel, 2018).
Presidential list – KDP set their own.
Gorran-PUK: The two parties signed a short-lived agreement in 2016 that ended seven years of 
separation after Gorran broke away from PUK (“PUK and Gorran sign,” 2016). The agreement 
failed to promote peaceful cooperation between the two parties and their relationships have 
returned to a state of rivalry (Fazil, 2018; “Full text of Gorran-PUK agreement,” 2016). 
Table 8: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
In 2006, KDP and PUK agreed to unite their two administrations under a reformed KRG (the so-called 5th 
Cabinet). This was followed up by a vow in 2007 in an attempt to implement a strategic agreement, dividing 
administrative and government positions between the two parties (H. Ahmed, 2012, 2014; IHS Global Insight, 
2013). Although it appeared as if the old political and military rivalry was settled, a closer view at the reforms 
shows that the merging only was carried out to some extent in areas where both parties had mutual interests 
and that the separate, party-affiliated Peshmerga forces were not united (International Crisis Group, 2015; 
Kurdistan Regional Government, n.d.-a; H. Morris, 2014).
The Peshmerga forces’ strong disunity and party loyalty stem from the time after Saddam Hussein’s army 
forces were ousted from the Kurdish area in the 1990s. With the help of defected Kurdish officers from the Iraqi 
Army, PUK and KDP established separate military academies in the Sulaymaniyah (PUK) and Dohuk (KDP) 
regions respectively. The two parties each professionalized their own soldiers to become conventional forces 
with an officer corps and military training (International Crisis Group, 2015). Even after the US had toppled 
Saddam Hussein, they did not succeed in merging the two parties’ Peshmerga forces under a single Kurdish 
banner.
An attempt at unification was made when a Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs was created in 2009 to comply 
with the stated political objective of unity from 2006, which consisted of both PUK and KDP party members. 
This allowed for some coordination between the forces, but officers continued reporting to their party  leaders 
and their intelligence services remained completely separated. The intelligence services each operated with 
separate sources, received information from different regional partners, and most importantly, rarely shared 
information with one another. If intelligence was to be shared between the two parties, it was bound by 
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political motives and done very selectively. This type of (non-) cooperation still exits (International Crisis 
Group, 2015).
The strategic agreement lasted until the 2013 elections, when PUK and KDP ran on separate lists. This 
resulted in the KDP winning 38 seats, PUK 18, and a third party – Gorran (Movement for Change) – surprised 
by winning 24 seats out of the parliament’s 111 (H. Ahmed, 2014; “IHEC announced final results,” 2013; “Iraqi 
Kurdistan opposition party,” 2013). The election disrupted the balance of power between PUK and KDP, and 
threatened the stability that had been a key driver in the impressive economic growth. The KDP and Gorran 
entered a government formation after months of negotiations but without signing a strategic agreement similar 
to the pre-existing one between PUK and KDP (“Understanding Between Gorran and KDP,” 2014).
Gorran’s key campaign causes were directed against corruption and party-based Peshmerga forces (Interna-
tional Crisis Group, 2015). In an interview with Rudaw in 2014, Yousif Mohammed Sadiq, then member of the 
KRG parliament for Gorran, stated:
The aim of Gorran is to institutionalize the government, to put an end to the system of two administrations. 
We don’t want to control the sphere of influence of the KDP or the PUK
(“Understanding Between Gorran and KDP,” 2014, para. 12).
Gorran received four positions in the cabinet as well as the post of Speaker of the Kurdish Parliament, most 
notable was the post of Minister of Peshmerga Affairs. While Gorran nominally possessed more strength than 
PUK, the party’s actual power was and still is limited, since it does not have a ‘private military’ or security force 
as the other two parties have. This severely limits the scope of influence for Gorran and its ability to counter its 
government partner KDP (International Crisis Group, 2015; Sugarman, 2013). If Gorran is to play an impor-
tant role in determining KRG politics, the state of party-loyal Peshmerga forces and administrative personnel 
has to be changed.
The election in 2013 also secured the KDP’s wish to extend Masoud Barzani’s presidency and form a coali-
tion from a position of strength (IHS Global Insight, 2013). Barzani, who was elected President of the KRG in 
2005, ended his second term in 2013 – which according to the constitution should have been his last term, as 
the presidency of the KRG is limited to two four-year terms (Kelly, 2010 p. 740). However, Barzani’s second 
term was extended by the Kurdish parliament through a presidential law that allowed him to stay in power for 
two more years. Despite the result of the elections, the PUK continued to dominate Sulaymaniyah, with Gorran 
challenging it politically. Nevertheless, since Gorran possessed no security forces, the party has not been in a 
position to challenge PUK’s security and patronage dominance of Sulaymaniyah. The KDP continued after the 
election to dominate Erbil and Dohuk (Shapland, 2015).
In the wake of Gorran’s landslide election another challenge to the political balance in the KRG’s political 
system evolved. The Kurdish region was getting embroiled in a very disruptive political conflict with Baghdad 
over its oil sales and federal revenues, only adding to the general instability in KRG territory (Fathallah, 2015). 
According to the Iraqi constitution of 2005, the KRG was to receive 17% of the national budget (Natali, 2015). 
However, in 2014 Baghdad froze and withheld some of these funds due to a conflict over Kurdish oil produc-
tion and exports (Zaman, 2016). The conflict was rooted in KRG building a pipeline, thereby facilitating oil 
exports to Turkey independently outside of the Iraqi state oil company, Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization 
(Coles, 2014a). According to Baghdad, the revenue from this export should be deducted from the 17%, while 
KRG insisted that the two things should be kept separately. In 2014, the KRG Finance Minister stated:
It has been years since the Baghdad government last sent the region’s budget, which amounts to 17% of the 
general Iraqi budget. Instead, the central government was deducting up to 6% of the allocated 17% under 
the pretext that it was deducting the sovereign and governing expenditure.
(Al-Haasoun, 2014, para. 9)
Then Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated in response to the Kurdish demand, “The equation is simple: 
you take 17 percent of the wealth, you hand over the oil you have” (Coles, 2014a, para. 15). The conflict mir-
rored the general Iraqi Kurdish dissatisfaction with Maliki’s centralized politics and their partial indifference 
with Baghdad’s concerns that the KRG’s ability to sell oil independently would threaten Iraq’s territorial integ-
rity (Barbarani, 2015).
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Gorran (Movement for Change)
Established In 2009 by former PUK member Nawshirwan Mustafa. Mustafa was the leader until he died 
after a long struggle with illness in May 2017 (“Gorran leader Nawshirwan Mustafa,” 2017; 
“Gorran Movement for Change,” n.d.).
Territory The Iraqi Kurdistan territory, in Iraq, but as the KRG administrations continue to be split between 
KDP in Erbil and PUK in Sulaymaniyah, Gorran is without a party-loyal administration.
Organizational 
Structure
Internal elections to choose their leadership (N. Ahmed, 2012; Kurdistan Democratic Party, 
2010; “PUK deputies announced,” 2016).
Leader: Omar Sayid Ali (“New Gorran leader,” 2017).
Armed Forces Gorran does not command armed forces. It has unsuccessfully sought to unify the Peshmerga 
forces under the sole command of the KRG.
Political Goals To challenge the status quo of corruption, abuse of power, an economic monopoly, a public 
service crisis, and employment of suitable positions (“At First Convention,” 2013).
Ideology Gorran is more left-wing and ideologically closer to PUK than KDP (Gorran, 2014; “PUK: 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan,” n.d.).
Rivals KDP
Competitor PUK
Operative partners and 
alliances 
KDP-Gorran: After Gorran’s landslide election in 2013, KDP and Gorran formed a coalition 
government, without signing a strategic agreement similar to that of the PUK-KDP. This was 
disrupted in October 2015 when KDP sacked Gorran’s ministers. Since then, their relationship 
has deteriorated with Gorran opposing the largely KDP driven independence referendum 
(Fantappie, 2018).
Gorran-PUK: The two parties signed a short-lived agreement in 2016 that ended seven years of 
separation after Gorran broke away from PUK (“PUK and Gorran sign,” 2016). The agreement 
failed to promote peaceful cooperation between the two parties and their relationships have 
returned to a state of rivalry (Fazil, 2018; “Full text of Gorran-PUK agreement,” 2016).
Table 9: Gorran (Movement for Change).
The Economic Downfall of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region
The conflict over the national funds came at a time when the Kurdistan Region’s economy was in its worse 
shape since Saddam Hussein was overthrown. The region’s double-digit growth had been replaced by a fall 
of 50% in its import/export rates compared to the 2013 level due to the fall in oil prices in the subsequent 
economic crisis brewing in Iraqi Kurdistan. The crisis was also fueled by other factors and according to Yassin 
Rashid, an official in the Kurdistan Investors Union, besides Baghdad’s withholding of public funds, political 
turmoil in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and the general instability in the Middle East also added negatively to 
prosperity in the Kurdish region of Iraq (Al-Haasoun, 2014).
While these factors most likely have had a negative effect on the economy, several other sources have ascribed 
factors such as corruption, patronage, and a misuse of public funds as key drivers in fueling the economic crisis. 
According to Transparency International’s latest report on the KRG (2015), the levels of corruption are:
Relatively high compared to other countries in the region … and rooted in the strong role that the two 
established political parties have in the political system, nepotism, a weak bureaucratic governance system 
and the task to ensure proper use of oil revenues.
(Pring, 2015, p. 1)
In 2006, the US State Department described corruption as Iraqi Kurdistan’s biggest economic problem in a 
cable made public by WikiLeaks. The cable describes how the Kurdish population in the Kurdistan Region 
generally perceive KDP and PUK as extremely corrupt. The corruption within the KDP is described as cen-
tered around the Barzani clan while PUK corruption is described as centered on old Peshmerga ties. This 
system promotes a patron-client relationship where business is done within party lines and public contracts 
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are rewarded within the patronage network. The system is held up by the parties’ control of their respective 
security forces, Peshmergas, who then enforce the illegal contracts (U.S. Department of State, 2006). In May 
2016, Ali Hama Salih from Gorran filed a corruption suit against 20 senior Kurdish officials for misuse of 
public funds and land seizures (“Kurdish MP to file,” 2016). The depth of the corruption is described in the 
vast articles on corruption published by Iraqi Kurdish newspapers. Ekurd, a Kurdish newspaper in a period of 
six months in 2016 wrote more than 45 articles on corruption in the KRG (“Corruption in Iraqi Kurdistan,” 
2016). A Carnegie Middle East Center report explains the political economy of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region as 
relying on economic monopolies and nepotistic networks to enrich the region’s elite (Hassan, 2015). A claim 
supported by the  International Crisis Group, which also describes the economic system of Iraqi Kurdistan as 
corrupted top-down and based entirely on party cronyism (International Crisis Group, 2015). Based on the 
above, it appears evident that the misuse of Iraqi Kurdistan’s public funds through corruption and patronage 
networks is widespread, recognized, and documented.
The KRG has since the economic crisis in 2014 been struggling to pay salaries to public employees. In 
November 2015, the KRG’s Head of Foreign Relations, Falah Mustafa Bakir said: “We are three months behind 
in paying the salaries of our own civil servants” (“Iraqi Kurdistan govt behind,” 2015, para. 8). As the KRG 
uses an astonishing 70-80% (out of which approximately one third is allocated for the Peshmerga forces) of 
their monthly budget alone to pay salaries and pensions for about 1.4 million people in the Kurdistan Region, 
the withholding of public salaries and pensions naturally generates a dangerous dissatisfaction (El-Ghobashy, 
2016; Hassan, 2015; “KRG says delayed salaries,” 2015). In the wake of the withholding of salaries, deadly 
clashes have taken place in several large cities (Coles, 2016b; “Teachers’ strike,” 2015). In hindsight, it seems 
unsustainable and highly sensitive to fiscal fluctuations to spend around three quarters of the budget on public 
salaries, when revenues primarily are based on oil and resource allocation from the federal state. Since 2013, 
the world price for oil has dropped severely from above a barrel price of USD 100 to below USD 50 per barrel, 
challenging the KRG bid for independent financing through its vast oil reserves (Statista, 2018). A likely out-
come of the crisis could be that the KRG must increase its revenues from the Iraqi state again or seek new ways 
to secure its financing independently from Baghdad. Additional factors that have affected the economy of the 
Kurdistan Region is the war against ISIS that has resulted in more than a million and a half refugees from Syria 
and Iraq having arrived in Iraqi Kurdistan, increasing the population of the Kurdistan Region by 30%, which 
naturally also puts pressure on the expenses (E. Butler, 2015; Coles, 2016b; “Iraqi Kurdistan govt behind,” 2015; 
Kittleson, 2016; “Kurdistan selling oil,” 2015; Uyanik, 2017).
In February 2016, after several months of protests in the streets as a result of KRG not paying salaries to 
its employees and not being able to pay international oil companies, the conflict between Baghdad and KRG 
appeared to have come to an end (EconSource, 2016). Baghdad and KRG agreed that KRG in the future 
would sell its oil through the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization in exchange for Baghdad paying the KRG 
employees’ salaries, a deal which would have ended the KRG’s independent oil adventure (El-Ghobashy, 2016; 
“Iraqi Kurdistan agrees,” 2016; ”Iraqi Kurds accept Baghdad’s deal,” 2016). The deal was to be implemented in 
the Iraqi Federal Budget of 2017. The proposed 2017 federal budget would allocate 17% of the Iraqi Federal 
Budget to the KRG in exchange for the KRG to export 550,000 barrels of oil a day from the Kirkuk and Iraqi 
Kurdish Region oilfields through the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization. In the final parliamentary ses-
sions between the Kurdish and Iraqi political parties, the KDP suddenly decided to withdraw from the 2017 
Iraqi Federal Budget sessions (Malazada, 2016). The KDP withdrew from the sessions because it claimed it 
would go against their aim of becoming economically independent of Baghdad through oil sales and because it 
distrusted Baghdad to finance the KRG’s Peshmerga forces (Goran, 2016; Malazada, 2016). KDP’s withdrawal 
was not a unified Iraqi Kurdish action because PUK, Gorran, Kurdistan Islamic Group, and Kurdistan Islamic 
Union all decided to vote for the 2017 Iraqi Federal Budget – thereby securing its approval. The vote showed a 
strong disunity among the Iraqi Kurdish groups towards Baghdad and political disagreement on how the KRG 
can pay its salaries.
Although the 2017 Federal Budget was approved, the KRG has raised concern that its Peshmerga forces 
have not received any money from Baghdad. In this regard, Barzani has said: “Since 2005, the Federal Gov-
ernment of Iraq has not enacted the financial rights of Peshmerga and the Kurdistan Region by making 
up different excuses” (S. Ali, 2017b, para. 9). Once again the financial relationship between the KRG and 
Baghdad is left in uncertainty with KDP seeking revenue independent of Baghdad, which is a core condition 
if the Iraqi Kurdistan Region is to become sovereign. Meanwhile, the opposition parties (PUK, Gorran, the 
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Kurdistan Islamic Group, and the Kurdistan Islamic Union) sought the relief that the Iraqi Federal Budget 
offered to help solve the Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s economic problems and allow the government to pay its 
public employees and pensions.
ISIS Attacks Kurdistan – The Fall of Sinjar
ISIS took the world by surprise when it swept across from Syria to Iraq and conquered Mosul in June 2014, 
Iraq’s second largest city, and large swathes of territories with a majority of Sunni-Arab population.  According 
to Iraqi officials, the Iraqi Army in Mosul was defeated after three days of sporadic fighting when roughly 
30,000 Iraqi soldiers fled in face of an insurgent force of 800 fighters. This allowed ISIS to strip Mosul’s military 
base for weapons, steal USD 480 million in banknotes and free thousands of prisoners to join their ranks (Chu-
lov, Hawramy, & Ackerman, 2014; Ignatius, 2015).
As Mosul is situated close to the Kurdistan Region’s borders, the threat from ISIS to the Kurdish Region 
was imminent after the city fell. In August 2014, ISIS managed to break its standoff with the Kurdish forces 
and rush their borders. They managed to capture areas inhabited by the Yazidi minority in Sinjar moving as 
close as 45 kilometers within range of Erbil in 2014 (International Crisis Group, 2015). A day prior to the fall 
of Sinjar, the city of Zumar with its rich oil fields was lost to ISIS after the Kurdish Peshmerga largely fled, as 
it later also came to be the case in Sinjar. The initial Kurdish defeats to ISIS surprised the Kurdish leadership, 
since Zumar was under the protection of the Peshmerga forces that had boasted they would be able to keep 
ISIS in check. With the loss of Sinjar only a day after Zumar, the image and reputation of the Peshmerga forces 
was shattered. A local Yazidi official from Sinjar stated in an interview with Al Monitor “They (Peshmerga and 
Security Commanders, ed.) fled before the people did,” (Salih, 2014, para. 6) further underlining the inability 
of the Peshmerga forces to protect the area.
The Peshmerga’s failure to keep ISIS at bay prompted the Kurdish leadership to appeal for international help. 
The KRG president Barzani asked in August 2014: “What we are asking our friends to do is to  provide support 
and to cooperate with us in providing the necessary weapons that would enable us to defeat these terrorist 
groups” (“Iraqi Kurdish leader Barzani seeks weapons to fight IS,” 2014, para. 14). The US answered the call, 
halted ISIS advances in the Kurdistan Region with heavy air strikes on ISIS positions, thereby limiting ISIS’s 
freedom of movement in the area. Additionally, the air strikes took out some of the heavy weaponry ISIS had 
looted from Mosul and subsequently used against the Kurds (Marcus, 2014; Pollack, 2014; Shapland, 2015).
Kenneth M. Pollack challenges the above statement that ISIS’s advance was primarily halted by US air strikes 
by explaining why ISIS managed to overrun the Kurdish territory by identifying three key military factors: 
Firstly, he says it was because ISIS took the Kurds by surprise, since ISIS at the time seemed focused on an 
attack to the south towards Baghdad. Secondly, the territory of the Yazidi and other groups are not “core ter-
ritory” for the KRG, which could have limited the Peshmerga’s will to defend it. Thirdly, ISIS’s heavy weapons 
gave them a tactical advantage against Kurdish lighter infantry. As the element of surprise passed, the Pesh-
merga regrouped their heavy weapons along newly emerged front lines with a focus on defending “core” KRG 
territory, which is what effectively halted ISIS’s advance (Pollack, 2014). Whether Pollack’s explanation is valid 
does not change the fact that the Kurdish defenses were broken. In hindsight, it appears the fall of Sinjar was 
largely due to the lack of information sharing on ISIS movement between the different party-affiliated Pesh-
merga intelligence services and the lack of ability of the Kurdish troops to cooperate. A week after the fall of 
Mosul, the KRG called for unification of all the Peshmerga forces, which even in the face of an existential war 
against ISIS, the KRG was not able to achieve, illuminating just how deep the Peshmerga split is (Fumerton & 
van Wilgenburg, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2015; Shapland, 2015).
The Peshmerga disunity also appears in the fight against ISIS. PUK and KDP have handled the threat of 
ISIS by dividing the defense of KRG territory between them. The KDP loyal Peshmerga forces are in charge of 
north and west, while PUK defend the south and east. Iran appears to be supporting PUK while the US and 
Turkey are supporting KDP (Fumerton & van Wilgenburg, 2015). The regional powers’ different backings of 
the  parties of course also contribute to continuous internal split. For instance, US air strikes have been centered 
on the northern and western territory, supplying military training and weapons delivery through Erbil, thereby 
aiding the KDP Peshmerga forces, while the PUK forces in the south have received training and weapons 
from Iran (International Crisis Group, 2015; Kittleson, 2014). Reuters reported in September 2014 that the 
town of Amiri had been retaken from ISIS in a cooperative effort between Shiite militias, the Iraqi Army, 
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and  Kurdish Peshmerga forces under the auspices of Iranian advisors. Amiri is situated south of the  Kurdish 
 territory, prompting the possible, strong cooperation between PUK and Iran and underlining the proxy  factor 
(Coles, 2014b; Collard, 2014). At the end of 2017, there of course exists an alliance based on a common enemy, 
but as the threat from this common enemy declines the common ground might erode, which means other 
 conflicts and tension in general are bound to happen. This calls for diplomatic actions between the major 
 powers in terms of how stabilization in post-ISIS Syria should take place.
The Iraqi Kurdish Capture of Kirkuk
Kirkuk has long been a contested region between Turkmen, Arabs, and Kurds mainly due to its vast oil reserves. 
In the 1970s Saddam Hussein began evicting the region’s Kurds and Turkmen and replacing them with Arabs. 
This was reversed during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the Kurds reached Kirkuk before the American 
forces and began seizing property and evicting the migrated Arabs (“Iraqi Kurdistan profile,” 2017). The city 
has since had a clear majority of Kurdish citizens. A referendum vote to determine whether Kirkuk should 
join the Iraqi Kurdish Region was supposed to be held in 2007, but never took place. Kirkuk has since then 
remained in limbo. The economic relations between Baghdad and KRG began normalizing in the first half 
of 2016 despite intra-Kurdish disagreement in the Iraqi parliament on the situation of the oil-rich region of 
Kirkuk, currently held by the KRG. However, a threat of instability in a post-ISIS scenario is still looming. After 
Barzani in the beginning of 2016 called for a non-binding referendum for a sovereign Kurdistan, which could 
include Kirkuk, the threat materialized (“Barzani renews call,” 2016; Coles, 2016a).
After the fall of Mosul and the halt of ISIS advances in Iraq, thousands of Iraqi soldiers fled the military 
bases of Kirkuk in 2014, a move the Kurdish Peshmerga quickly reacted to by seizing the empty military bases 
and setting up a defensive perimeter around Kirkuk (“Iraqi Kurds ‘fully control Kirkuk’ as army flees”, 2014; 
Parkinson, 2014). Kurdish Peshmerga forces from both PUK and KDP have since looted the Iraqi military’s 
weapons and vehicles (Hawramy, 2014). This move seemed to play quite well in accordance to the Kurds’ long-
standing wish to incorporate the oil-rich region of Kirkuk into the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. The KRG quickly 
began exploiting the oil fields from Kirkuk in defiance of Baghdad producing more than 150,000 barrels of oil 
per day (Alabbasi, 2015; Solomon & Raval, 2014).
It remains to be seen if the KRG can hold on to Kirkuk in a post-ISIS scenario, but Barzani has recently stated 
in an interview with Al Monitor that: “Article 140 of the constitution … calls for a referendum on the disputed 
areas, in Kirkuk and in Sinjar. If the people say they want to be part of Kurdistan, their voices must be heard,” 
(Zaman, 2016, para. 60) indicating that that KRG has no intentions of leaving the city. Kirkuk’s participation 
in the KRG’s independence referendum on September 25, 2017 was to be decided by the Councilors of Kirkuk 
who voted in August 2017 on whether to take part in the independence vote. The Kirkuk council consists of 41 
members of Arab, Kurdish, and Turkmen ethnicity. The vote session on whether to join the KRG’s independ-
ence vote was nonetheless boycotted by Turkmen and Arab councilors who regarded it as unconstitutional, 
resulting in a narrow vote in favor by 22 out of 24 present councilors. The impartiality of this vote should be 
challenged as the Kurdish council members make up 26 of the total 41 council members, ensuring an ethnic 
Kurdish majority in the council. Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Abadi, who called the move “wrong” and said politi-
cal issues should not be handled like this, did not accept the vote (“Kirkuk votes,” 2017). The Kirkuk vote did 
not add any legitimacy to its inclusion in the KRG’s independence vote in the eyes of the Federal Government 
of Iraq and Turkey, who both described the vote as unconstitutional.
It is important to understand the actual level of disunity of the Iraqi Kurdish political actors amidst the popu-
lar independence referendum. Before addressing the fallout and consequences of the September 25 independ-
ence referendum, the political context within which the referendum took place will therefore be discussed in 
the next section.
The State of Press Freedom in Iraqi Kurdistan
An important element in the political situation at the end of 2017 and in the immediate future is the role of 
the Kurdish press in relation to elections and its general relationship with the KRG-leadership. As mentioned 
above KRG will strive for independence, and this makes it important to view the legitimacy of the present 
leadership in terms of the mandate provided by the civilian population. As a proclaimed democratic rule of 
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government, the press per definition has a huge role in political debates and campaigns. Though free in theory, 
many issues arise when looking at the freedom of the press in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.
Sarah Leah Whitson, executive director of the Middle East Division of Human Rights Watch (HRW), said in 
2013: “These are dark days for freedom of expression in Iraq’s Kurdistan region” (Human Rights Watch, 2013, 
para. 3). HRW reported in 2013 that the KRG were detaining journalists without trial for several months for 
insulting or defaming public figures. These include instances of journalists reporting stories on issues from gov-
ernment corruption to party-political influence within the juridical system. This tendency has not improved 
since the war against ISIS began, in fact Kamal Chomani, a Kurdish journalist, told Al Monitor in 2017:
When IS came, politics got even worse…. The Americans put [fighting] IS as the priority over everything 
else, and they stopped putting emphasis on development of civil society.
(Kimball, 2017, para. 17).
According to him, the US’s unconditional support for KDP and PUK in the fight against ISIS has allowed them 
to become so strong that they can crack down on any dissident. As Justin Shilad, a Middle Eastern and North 
African research associate at the Committee to Protect Journalists puts it:
Unconditional US military support does generally have the effect of indirectly contributing to a crackdown 
on local press when there is an implicit message that US military aid is not tied to or conditional upon 
respect for human rights.
(Kimball, 2017, para. 21).
In 2015, Freedom House concluded that the press status of Iraq, along with that of Iraqi Kurdistan, was “not 
free.” Freedom House elaborated on this with several instances of Kurdish parties asserting their influence on 
the media by bribing journalists with money, land, or other rewards for influence. Journalists had also been 
sued by the KRG for reporting on corruption, despite the Kurdish Press law allowing journalist to investigate 
corruption.
While critical journalists face criminal charges, another problem is that there are very few media not aligned 
or directly funded by a political party in the KRG. Freedom House reports how the financing of media favors 
those loyal to the major parties, while independent media struggle to attract funds (Freedom House, 2015). 
Middle East Eye also reports this trend of the major parties asserting huge influence on their respective media 
clients (MacDiarmid, 2015).
With the latest moves in the KRG to limit the free and impartial press, such as KDP’s closure of the Gorran 
affiliated KNN and privately owned NRT in Erbil and briefly detaining six NRT TV employees, the freedom 
of press seems to have come under threat in the internal political conflict between the major political parties 
(Freedom House, 2017; “Iraqi Kurdish authorities shut,” 2015; MacDiarmid, 2015). Sheriff Mansour, repre-
sentative of the Middle East and North Africa region to the Committee to Protect Journalists, said in 2015 
about the Iraqi Kurdistan free press development: “It shows how vulnerable the Kurdish experience is in terms 
of easily returning to an undemocratic past in dealing with the press” (MacDiarmid, 2015, para.30). In 2014, 
the Committee to Protect Journalists published a report arguing that the problem in Iraqi Kurdistan is that the 
press law is not being enforced when it comes to journalists, citing several cases of critical journalists facing 
threats or trials for reporting on corruption (Abdulla, 2014).
Iraq’s Political Development Post-ISIS
The political situation in Iraqi Kurdistan has been far from stable since the defeat of ISIS. Although the 
 parliamentary extension of his 2013 presidency had terminated in August 2015, Barzani continued to act as 
president until his announcement of standing down from November 1, 2017, in the aftermath of the  September 
25 independence referendum. The executive power was subsequently handed over to his nephew Prime  Minister 
Nechirvan Barzani. His executive powers were suspended by the Kurdish parliament in July 2018 (“Parliament 
votes to suspend,” 2018). Before Masoud Barzani’s withdrawal, there was no indication of when he would have 
stepped down, as his presidency had passed the KRG’s legal checks and balances (“Barzani will not extend,” 
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2017; IHS Global Insight, 2013; Kurdistan Regional Government, n.d.-c). Barzani’s decision to stay in office 
beyond his mandate was supported by the government body of Kurdistan’s Consultative Council (“Judicial 
Council,” 2015). However, this was not a unified decision with public or parliamentary support behind it. Yousif 
Mohammed Sadiq, acting Kurdish Iraqi parliament speaker and politically affiliated to Gorran, said in an inter-
view with Al Monitor in late August 2015 about Barzani’s continuation as president: “This will be against the 
laws in Kurdistan. Law No. 19 passed in 2013… clearly says the president’s term ends on Aug. 19 and cannot be 
extended” (Salih, 2015a, para. 8). In September 2015, shortly after Barzani’s second extension in August 2015, 
the Kurdish newspaper Ekurd wrote an article based on a public opinion poll conducted with 500 Kurdistan 
respondents, which found that 51% of the population disagreed with his extension, suggesting a strong division 
within the population in Iraqi Kurdistan (Greenberg Quinlan Rosiner Research, 2015; Wing, 2016).
The political crisis has since ignited. In October 2015, several Gorran MPs as well as the spokesperson of the 
Iraqi Kurdistan parliament, Sadiq, were restricted from access to Erbil by KDP-loyal security forces. Sadiq later 
expressed at a press conference in Sulaymaniyah: “This is an occupation of Erbil... and an attempt to launch a 
coup d’état against the main source of legitimacy in Kurdistan, which is the parliament“ (Salih, 2015b, para. 5). 
The event putting the statements in motion was protests in Sulaymaniyah, over the KRG failing to pay public 
salaries. This led to KDP offices being destroyed by protesters, which KDP claims Gorran was responsible for by 
directing people to attack their offices. KDP responded by expelling Gorran’s four ministers from the cabinet, 
along with clamping down on media allegedly affiliated with Gorran (H. Ahmed, 2015; Coles, 2015; Human 
Rights Watch, 2015; “Kurdish opposition Gorran,” 2015). By the end of October 2015, Barzani and the KDP 
appointed new acting ministers. Gorran maintained that Parliament Speaker Sadiq cannot legally be removed 
except through a parliamentary vote, which has not taken place (Coles, 2015; Hawrami, 2016). In the after-
math of the crisis, the Iraqi Kurdish parliament has been paralyzed as its spokesperson and  Gorran  members 
have been effectively derailed from the political decision process. In January 2016, there were even reports of 
the KDP planning to prosecute Nawshirwan Mustafa, the leader of Gorran (currently living in  London under 
self-imposed exile), for inciting violence and planning to target the KDP government headquarters (“Barzani’s 
KDP intends,” 2016; Chomani, 2016). In the midst of this, PUK has played a more passive role as the party 
is still struggling to unite around a new leader after its popular founder’s (Talabani) retirement from politics 
(Pollack, 2016).
Amidst this political crisis, Barzani had actively attempted to affect the primary political agenda in KRG by 
calling for a referendum, to be held within Iraqi Kurdistan, on independent Kurdish statehood which took 
place in September 2017 (Sattar, 2016). Al Monitor asked Barzani in an interview in March 2016 whether this 
referendum was a ploy to divert attention away from the region’s political and economic problems. He denied 
this and explained that the recent move was based on a longstanding disagreement with Baghdad’s lack of 
respect for Kurdish autonomy and former economic crisis (Zaman, 2016).
The political crisis in the KRG is not likely to be resolved in any near future because the core issues of nepo-
tism, corruption, and divided government and security forces run deep. There are signs of improvements since 
officials from KDP and Gorran say they are trying to resolve their political disputes. Ahmed Kani, from the 
KDP political leadership told Rudaw, “The situation in the Kurdistan Region today calls for a new agreement 
and a new approach with Gorran,” (“Financial crisis and referendum,” 2016, para. 2) on the financial crisis and 
independence referendum. PUK and KDP have also approached each other on the independence question, 
and in April 2016, they issued a joint statement in response to the political turmoil in Baghdad, showing their 
ability to unite when dealing with Baghdad (“KDP-PUK meet,” 2016).
The new signs of improvements between the Iraqi Kurdistan’s parties could be signs of their former political 
disputes being mended in order to face up to the regions’ challenges. Although it appears more plausible that 
the political events in 2016 showed how important a factor loyal militia forces constitute in the KRG’s politics. 
Gorran is a showcase example of how a democratically elected mandate was sacked by a KDP-party-loyal 
administration and militia force in Erbil. With PUK having struggled to set the agenda after their former leader 
and founder Jalal Talabani died, the KDP was able to take the leadership of the independence referendum 
through the control of the executive branch of government. It was not until a few weeks before the independ-
ence vote that the Iraqi Kurdish parliament gathered for the first time in over two years to approve the refer-
endum (“Iraqi Kurdish parliament,” 2017; Vickery, 2017). A parliamentary session which Gorran boycotted, 
signaling that politics in Erbil had not returned to normalcy and that the referendum might be taking place 
when the Kurdish Region was showing increasing authoritarian tendencies.
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In the referendum process, Gorran and Kurdistan Islamic Group have represented the strongest opposition 
to the KDP and PUK two-party split administration and Peshmerga forces system that dominate the KRG. It 
is therefore vital to include how they view the independence referendum while having mostly been institution-
ally sidelined in the process through the effective suspension of the Iraqi Kurdish parliament from 2015-2017. 
On September 20, five days before the vote was to take place, Gorran and the Kurdistan Islamic Group issued 
a joint statement saying: “The right of self-determination and the establishment of an independent state for 
Kurdistan is a natural right of Kurdistan’s nation.” While acknowledging the natural right of an independent 
Kurdistan, the statement also warned that
Holding a referendum under the current complex circumstances marked by numerous crises and an 
 uncertain future does not serve this strategy. Rather, it is a dangerous step for now and the future of our 
nation.
(“Holding referendum now,” 2017, para. 3).
The two opposition parties continued to raise concerns that holding the September 25 referendum could lead 
to armed combat between Peshmerga and Iraqi Security Forces if Kirkuk and other disputed territories were 
included in the referendum. They elaborated that the vote could lead to the loss of these territories: “For which 
we (Iraqi Kurds) have sacrificed thousands of lives” (“Holding referendum now,” 2017, para. 7). Instead of 
Barzani’s unilateral call for the independence referendum without international support and fierce opposition 
from Baghdad, Gorran and the Kurdistan Islamic Group thought independence should be sought through 
dialogue with international mediation. Most importantly, Gorran and the Kurdistan Islamic Group held that 
the process should not have taken place at the time. They held that such a process should be postponed until 
unity within the Iraqi Kurdish Region, better party relations, restoration of legal institutions, and improvement 
of people’s living conditions had been achieved. Their call for postponing the vote was rejected by the KRG, 
whose executive branch is dominated by KDP and who saw it as a historical opportunity for the Kurds to seek 
statehood (“Holding referendum now,” 2017).
The independence referendum enjoyed wide popular support among the voters in the Iraqi Kurdistan 
Region, especially after the US, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, the UN Security Council, and other international powers 
united against the referendum (Cook, 2017b; Fahim, El-Ghobashy, & Salim, 2017; Hardi, 2017; “UN chief 
voices concern,” 2017). However, critics of this popular vote have raised concerns that the timing of the refer-
endum could have been a move for political survival by KDP and Barzani rather than an attempt to realize the 
Iraqi Kurds’ long striving for statehood. Steven A. Cook described Barzani’s call for independence as foremost 
to place his rivals (PUK and Gorran) on the defensive – as they would suffer political losses if they opposed 
the popular vote for independence (Cook, 2017a). Choman Hardi criticizes Barzani’s refusal to step down after 
his presidential term expired for dividing rather than uniting the people. She warns that state building and 
democracy building should not be considered separately. In her opinion, the Iraqi Kurdistan Region lacks the 
basic conditions necessary for statehood such as economic infrastructure, stable and independent legislative, 
executive, and judiciary institutions, as well as united Peshmerga and security forces (Hardi, 2017). These inter-
nal factors would have posed serious legitimacy problems for a sovereign Iraqi Kurdistan to be recognized as 
a democratic state. Although these are important factors, the question of the Iraqi Kurds’ independence must 
also be analyzed from a geopolitical point of view. If the Iraqi Kurdish population, who after WWI was force-
fully incorporated into Iraq, successfully can declare independence from Iraq, it could serve as precedence for 
other large Kurdish ethnic groups in Turkey, Iran, and Syria to legitimately seek sovereignty. A move which 
would reshape the Middle East and tear up the borders of already weak states in Syria and Iraq and change the 
balance of power in the region, which would add to the instability of the latest decades.
The Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s political crisis, economic downfall, high dependency on the Iraqi Federal 
Budget, and lack of international recognition as a sovereign state were serious obstacles, which were not solved 
before the Iraqi Kurds went to the polls throughout the Kurdistan Region and its disputed areas such as Kirkuk. 
At a national level, the preparations for the independence referendum took place at a time when the Federal 
Government in Baghdad had been embroiled in a political crisis following the failure of the Iraqi Parliament 
in May 2016 to appoint a new cabinet to govern the country (Behn, 2016; Fitch & Adnan, 2016). Furthermore, 
the Iraqi Government was at the time of the preparation for the referendum heavily involved in a huge military 
operation to retake Mosul from ISIS, undertaken from October 2016 to July 2017 (“How the battle,” 2017). A 
military mission, which also included Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces on the eastern front of the Mosul battle 
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(S. Ali, 2017a). After the Iraqi security forces had retaken Mosul and other key ISIS strongholds in Iraq, they 
were able to focus on the Kurdish independence referendum from a position of strength compared to when 
it was announced in 2016 (Arango, 2017). Iraq’s Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said in the days leading up 
to the referendum that it was unconstitutional and would only make it more difficult for the Kurdish region 
to engage in negotiations with Iraq. Furthermore, he stated that if the referendum was to result in violence, 
 Baghdad was prepared to intervene militarily (“Iraq Leader Says,” 2017; Rasheed & Jalabi, 2017).
None of the KRG’s allies, apart from Israel, backed the move for independence. It is therefore not given 
that the referendum, which was non-binding, will ever result in a declaration of independence. However, it 
did show the opinion and wishes of the Iraqi Kurdistan citizens (MacDonald, 2016). If the KRG’s referendum 
for independence was to become reality, it would need the support of Turkey, an unusual ally for a Kurdish 
actor, considering how Turkey has fought a 30-year-long armed conflict against PKK. Additionally, as pointed 
out earlier, the Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s economy is based on oil export outside the Iraqi State Oil Marketing 
Organization and the Iraqi federal budget. If the Kurdistan Region were to become independent from Iraq, its 
financial security would rest on its ability to sell oil on the international market. By the end of 2017, this only 
been possible though the Iraqi-Turkish Pipeline which the KRG has used to sell oil independently through 
Turkey (Natali, 2015). This means that Iraqi Kurdistan’s relationship with Turkey has become fundamental for 
its independence strategy. The next chapter will therefore highlight how Iraqi Kurdistan-Turkish relationship 
developed and how it has been affected by Barzani’s call for independence.
Relationship with Turkey
The overall relationship between Turkey and Kurdish groups is troublesome at best. It is therefore interesting 
that Turkey’s relationship with the Iraqi Kurds has gone from cold to mildly warm in the last decade. When 
the Iraqi Kurdistan Region was declared semi-autonomous in the 1990s, Turkey was skeptical and feared it 
could fuel the separatist Kurdish movements (especially PKK) inside Turkey. However, after the US removal 
of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and attempt of democratizing Iraq, Turkey has actually stepped up its financial 
investments in the energy sector of Iraqi Kurdistan. There is of course a variety of reasons for these invest-
ments in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. An important one was that the KRG established a very business-friendly 
environment through legislation, which provided conditions that attracted Turkish capital. Another likely 
factor is that Turkey’s energy cooperation with KRG also lessens its reliance on Iranian gas and Russian oil, 
thereby strengthening the security of the country’s general energy infrastructure (Natali, 2014). A third factor 
is that the investments in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s economy could have an internal security dimension. 
By introducing and helping the KRG to sustain a market economy as an alternative economic model to PKK’s 
and PYD’s Öcalan-model, which is inspired more by Communist economic theory, Turkey facilitates internal 
Kurdish division (Bechev, 2013; Hassan, 2015).
The close economic relationship is visible through Turkey’s allowing of Iraqi Kurdistan to export oil through 
a newly built pipeline, bypassing Baghdad’s federal system, and selling it from the Turkish port of Ceyhan. 
Another indication is that 70% of Turkey’s export to Iraq goes to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (“First tranche 
of Kurdish,” 2014). Analyzing the trade between the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and Turkey, the economic rela-
tionship shows that Turkey’s exports are primarily consumer and luxury goods and executing construction 
projects, which largely have benefitted Turkey’s economy more in comparison to the economy of the Iraqi 
Kurdistan Region. Furthermore, the economic benefit to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region from the trade seems to 
have disproportionally enriched KDP and PUK officials and their political partners through a nepotistic sys-
tem that to a large extent enhanced KDP’s rather than PUK’s hold on power. Turkey’s large consumption of the 
Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s oil makes the KRG very dependent on Turkey and on oil prices (Aqrawi, 2011; Hassan, 
2015; Natali, 2014). Changes in oil prices, as seen in the latest years, have implied severe negative consequences 
for the economy of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.
The relationship between the KRG and Turkey leading up to the KRG’s referendum was built upon Turkey’s 
national interest in cooperating with the KRG in order to contain the growing role of the PYD/YPG in Syria 
near its southern borders (Cagaptay et al., 2015). Turkey’s interest in containing PYD through cooperation 
with KRG was underlined when Barzani and Erdoğan met in the Turkish city of Diyarbakir in 2013 at an event 
labeled the “Diyarbakir encounter” to make a pro-peace statement together. According to Al Monitor journal-
ist Cengiz Candar, this event was a “political marriage” between the KRG and the Justice and Development 
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Party, the party Erdoğan founded (Çandar, 2013). The event was until the last minute criticized by the Turkish 
Kurdish party Peace and Democracy Party as an electoral stunt by Erdoğan, because Barzani was invited by 
Erdoğan alone and not by any Kurdish party. The Justice and Development Party and the Peace and Democracy 
Party are electoral rivals. In 2013, they were blaming each other for the slow peace talks between the Turkish 
Government and PKK. At the meeting, Barzani said: “I believe the process [between Ankara and the PKK] will 
end in success and we should put all our efforts into it” (Uras, 2013, para. 12). The joint statement came at a 
time when the Syrian Kurds under the aspirations of the Syrian Kurdish party PYD were creating their own 
interim government in Northern Syria (Çandar, 2013; Uras, 2013). A move that was rejected by both Turkey 
and the KRG, indicating that their interests in this regard were aligned (“Interim assembly,” 2013; “PYD has 
authority only,” 2013). Nursel Aydogan, a Peace and Democracy Party lawmaker in the Turkish parliament, 
claimed that Barzani was seeking to delay the aspirations of the Syrian Kurds in Syria. According to her, the 
“Syrian Kurds are not on the same page with Barzani. Öcalan’s line dominates 80-90 percent [of the Syrian 
Kurds]” (Uras, 2013, para. 24). This criticism, along with the joint statement between Erdoğan and Barzani, 
emphasizes the continued perceived rivalry between Öcalan and Barzani for a united regional leadership of the 
Kurdish population.
The strong relationship between Ankara and KRG was also illuminated when Kobane was under attack from 
ISIS. Turkey allowed Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga to enter Syria through its territory to assist the Syrian Kurds, 
while at the same time Turkey was working hard to keep its own Kurdish citizens out of Syria. Thus, it appears 
that Turkey does not perceive the KRG as a PKK affiliate, as it does with the PYD, but as a far more reliable and 
less threatening partner (“Islamic State: Why Turkey prefers,” 2014).
The mutually beneficial relationship also came into play when violence and tension again broke out between 
PKK and the Turkish Government in July 2015 after the Turkish Government launched airstrikes against PKK 
camps in northern Iraq (D. Butler, 2015). When Barzani addressed the clashes between the Turkish military 
and PKK, he took a very diplomatic role during his visit in Ankara stating that ”the situation has to be solved in 
peaceful ways... maybe it needs time, but it has to be through dialogue and negotiation” (S. Ali, 2015, para. 8). 
Barzani said he was ready to play the role of a peace negotiator between the parties if needed (Khalidi, 2015).
The joint efforts and apparent mutual interests between Erdoğan and Barzani in containing the influence of 
PKK and PYD in Turkey and Syria have taken many shapes. At the beginning of the Syrian conflict, Barzani 
attempted to organize the Syrian Kurds to unite under his leadership by inviting the various groups to partici-
pate in the Kurdish Supreme Committee (KSC). KSC succeeded in formally including the powerful PYD in 
2012 alongside the Barzani backed KNC with a promise to share the power equally (Ates, 2012). To Turkey, 
this was a chance to limit the influence of PYD’s growing position in Northern Syria. Turkey’s special relation-
ship with Barzani and its large economic leverage toward the KRG provided Erdoğan with an opportunity to 
contain PYD through Barzani (Tol, 2012b). As noted, the power-sharing agreement was not implemented, 
and shortly after, the PYD/YPG took control of the Syrian Kurdish territories and declared semi-autonomous 
regions. This, along with the inability of KNC to reach an agreement with PYD to deploy its KRG-trained 
Syrian Peshmerga forces in Syria, left Barzani as an ally to the Turks without strong influence over the armed 
Syrian Kurds. Furthermore, Turkey has since begun its own military operation to contain PYD’s territorial 
advances in Syria and has halted them in uniting their cantons. All this in sum has reduced Barzani’s influ-
ence on the Syrian Kurds severely and thereby most likely reduced his value to Turkey as an operational ally in 
relation to Turkish interest in Syria, which includes containing PYD and ending the conflict with PKK, which 
has left more than 2,000 dead in south-east Turkey (Stein, 2014; “Turkey-PKK conflict,” 2017). Turkey has 
taken a hard stance on the KRG’s referendum along with Iran, Iraq, and US, hinting that their previous special 
relationship is deteriorating, and that a sovereign Kurdish state is unacceptable for Turkey. Prior to the vote, 
the Turkish parliament extended a mandate that allowed Turkish troop deployment in Syria and Iraq. Turkey’s 
President Erdoğan also threatened to stop the oil flow from northern Iraq and urged the KRG to abort the 
referendum (Cupolo, 2017; “Turkey threatens,” 2017).
The Fallout of the Kurdish Region’s Independence Referendum
On September 25, 2017, the voter turnout in Iraqi Kurdistan and disputed areas was around 3.3 million, or 72% 
of eligible voters (“Iraqi Kurds overwhelmingly back split,” 2017). The electoral commission said 92% voted in 
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favor of a split from Iraq, giving the KRG a strong mandate from its citizens to engage in negotiations on inde-
pendence with Baghdad and neighboring countries (“Iraqi Kurds decisively back,” 2017). Such negotiations did 
not take place as Iraq’s Prime Minister Haider Al-Adabi said he would “never discuss” the “illegal” referendum’s 
result and called on the KRG to cancel the result and its outcome if they wished to start talks (“Iraqi Kurds over-
whelmingly back split,” 2017; “Iraqi PM urges,” 2017). Baghdad did not stop at only rejecting the referendum, 
the Iraqi Parliament furthermore called for deployment of troops to Kirkuk to take back the disputed oil fields, 
which most likely would erode the KRG’s independent oil economy, and suspended international flights to the 
Iraqi Kurdistan Region (“Iraqi Kurds overwhelmingly back split,” 2017).
Neither at the international level did the KRG receive support to legitimize their referendum against Bagh-
dad’s rejection. Key regional actors such as Turkey and Iran were fierce opponents of the referendum and 
united with Baghdad. Iran closed its airspace to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region on September 25 and has since 
moved tanks and artillery to the border of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and, together with the Iraqi military, 
conducted military drills and carried out war-games near the border (“Iran denies reports,” 2017; Jalabi, 2017). 
Iran’s actions illustrate a strong Iranian presence and support for Baghdad’s response to the referendum.
Turkey’s response signaled a severe change in its former warm relationship with KRG. Turkey’s president 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said:
We don’t regret what we did in the past. But since the conditions are changed and the Kurdish Regional 
Government, to which we provided all support, took steps against us, it would pay the price.
(Barut & Evans, 2017, para. 5).
The statement communicated clearly to the KRG that the warm days of Turkish support and investment had 
suffered greatly by the independence referendum. The KRG going through with the referendum, despite 
Turkish warnings, prompted Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim to state that Turkey would no longer 
deal with the Kurdish authorities in Erbil, but rather conduct its business with the Federal Government in 
Baghdad. The prime minister added that Turkey would not act alone to stop the independence but instead 
work together with Iran and Iraq “to ensure the games being played in the region will fail” (Barut & Evans, 
2017, para. 10). On the day, the referendum took place, Turkey and Iraq held joint military exercises on their 
border, and Turkey later threatened to close its border to the Iraqi Kurdish Region (“Turkey to close bor-
ders,” 2017). Turkey’s and Iran’s strong stands against an independent Iraqi Kurdistan are possibly due to the 
precedence an independent Kurdish state could set for other Kurdish ethnic minorities living within Syria, 
Iran, and Turkey. An independence call, successful or not, could revive the Kurdish national ambitions and 
fuel PKK’s current insurgency in Turkey or revive PJAK’s in Iran. It could also feed the ambitions of PYD 
of creating an autonomous or independent Rojava near Turkey’s border. Such implications would threaten 
Turkey’s, Iran’s, and Syria’s respective national security and territorial integrity. If the Iraqi Kurds were able to 
break away from Iraq despite its Federal Government’s strong opposition, it could lead to similar scenarios in 
Turkey, Northern Syria, or Iran.
The referendum’s large regional impact brought together the former rivals of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, who 
all have had strained relationships in the past but now shared a strong national interest in preserving their 
territorial integrity (Srivastava & Bozorgmehr, 2017). On October 4, Erdoğan, Iranian President Hassan 
 Rouhani, and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met in Tehran for strategic talks. The agenda was how 
Iran and  Turkey could act together with Iraq to prevent Iraqi Kurdistan from declaring independence. The 
two  countries agreed to impose joint sanctions against the KRG. Rouhani and Erdoğan also issued a joint 
statement that they would work together to secure the territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria and under no 
circumstances accept the issue of separatism in the region (Majidyar, 2017). Their joint declaration on Syr-
ian integrity is curious, as Iran is a determined supporter of keeping Assad in power, whom Turkey for years 
sought to overthrow. This implies that Turkey’s national interest of preserving territorial integrity within 
countries where large Kurdish minorities live outweighs the overthrowing of Assad. This national Turkish – 
and  ranian – objective is likely to persist and permeate all aspects of the final battles against ISIS and 
 reconstruction of Syria and Iraq. NATO’s engagement in the region, and thereby Denmark’s, should therefore 
address this complex dilemma of relying on the effective Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish forces who have fought 
ISIS while at the same time hurting its relations with Turkey. NATO should develop a coherent strategy that 
prioritizes whom to stand firmly behind.
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At the geo-political level, Turkey’s improving ties with Iran (and Russia for that matter10) and deteriorating 
ties with the US over the Kurdish issue could affect the balance of power in the region. Turkey, a Sunni-majority 
state, would then be leaning towards Iran, a Shia-majority state and a regional competitor to the US. It remains 
to be seen how strong the Turkish and Iranian rapprochement is. As Ahmad Majidyar points out, a history 
of mistrust between the two countries is likely to erode the foundation for a strategic partnership (Majidyar, 
2017). Anyhow, their rapprochement illustrates that the Turkey-NATO relationship is reaching a new criti-
cal level, at which the US’s former policy of “kicking the can down the road” in regard to how to balance the 
effective Kurdish fighting effort against ISIS with Turkey’s concerns should be reviewed in the near future. 
Regarding Iraq, the US has spoken against the referendum and refused to recognize it in line with Turkey. US 
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said that “the vote and the results lacks legitimacy” (Wilts, 2017, para. 2) and 
that the US supports “a united, federal, democratic and prosperous Iraq.” He further added that the US urges 
its “Iraqi partners to remain focused on defeating ISIS/Daesh,” (Wilts, 2017, para., 7) once again highlighting 
that the key US priority in Iraq and Syria has been to defeat ISIS.
Despite the US call for relaxing tensions between Baghdad and KRG, tensions grew as Baghdad refused to 
recognize the referendum and began to move its Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces towards 
the southern borders of Kirkuk. A mobilization, which led KRG to deploy 6,000 additional Peshmerga forces 
to reinforce Kirkuk (MacDiarmid, 2017). After three days of armed standoff between the Iraqi Army and the 
Kurdish Peshmerga, Iraqi Security forces took full control of Kirkuk on October 16, 2017, with almost no 
opposition from Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga fighters despite having been ordered to defend their positions “at 
any cost” (“Baghdad: Iraqi forces,” 2017; “Iraq conflict: Peshmerga,” 2017). After having retaken the city, Iraqi 
officers took down the Kurdish flag at the provincial council building and replaced it with an Iraqi flag. While 
some took to the streets to celebrate the Iraqi Army’s return, others packed their cars and rushed to leave.
Kirkuk has left the US in a difficult position as it has trained both the Kurdish Peshmerga forces and the 
Iraqi Security Forces. In this regard, Trump has said: “We’re not taking sides,” (L. Morris & DeYoung, 2017, 
para. 5) adding that the US has a good relationship with both parties. A US statement on the Kurdish issue in 
the region that once again “kicks the can down road,” creating frustration for a US ally, the KRG, who have 
been a strategic partner since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Sami Abdul Rahman, the KRG’s representa-
tive in Washington, expressed his disbelief with Trump’s statement as: “How can you not take sides? …This 
is Iranian-backed militia, using American weapons, to attack an ally of the United States. I’m bewildered by 
the US government’s position” (L. Morris & DeYoung, 2017, para. 14). His comment should be seen in the 
context of the Iraqi security forces’ taking control of Kirkuk being heavily assisted by the Popular Mobilization 
Forces, an umbrella group that contains Iranian-backed militia groups, highlighting Iran’s support for Iraq in 
ensuring the Iraqi Kurds do not declare independence (“Baghdad: Iraqi forces,” 2017; L. Morris & DeYoung, 
2017). The situation in Kirkuk also illustrated the lack of a coherent US strategy to deal with the dilemma 
between sovereignty of the region’s nation states and the wishes for autonomy and independence of the dif-
ferent Kurdish parties. On the one hand, by arming the Kurdish minorities in the fight against ISIS, the US 
could risk threatening the national integrity of the regional states. On the other hand, by not supporting the 
Kurdish groups’ pursuit of their policy goals against regimes who have repressed them to different degrees, 
the US would abandon an ally it has armed and one that has been instrumental in the fight against ISIS. If this 
dilemma is not recognized at the highest political level and a coherent strategy is not developed, the US and 
supporting nations of Operation Inherent Resolve (which includes Denmark) could risk losing both the trust 
and allegiance of Turkey, Iraq, PYD/YPG (SDF), and KRG. A weakening of Turkey’s commitment to the US 
world order and the NATO alliance world be a more severe loss for the US and its partners, due to Turkey’s 
geo-political position and military capacities, in comparison to the risk of losing the operative and strategic 
alliances with the PYD, KRG, and Iraq.
After Baghdad had retaken Kirkuk, facing almost no resistance from the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga, a blame 
game between PUK and KDP began. KDP accused PUK, whose Peshmerga forces constituted the majority 
of the Kurdish defense of Kirkuk of treason by having agreed to withdraw in coordination with Baghdad. In 
return, Lahur Sheikh Jangi Talabani, leader of PUK’s counterterrorism units, accused KDP and Barzani for 
 10 Clearly there has been improvements since 2016, but the different stand toward Kurdish groups adds complexity to a possible 
future regional partnership.
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their ill-conceived independence referendum as a scheme to wrest control of Kirkuk from PUK, who within 
Kirkuk is perceived as the dominant and popular Kurdish force (Çandar, 2017; L. Morris & DeYoung, 2017). 
Kirkuk came to be a case study of how deep the Peshmerga division and mistrust had continued to run within 
the KRG. It even happened a day after PUK and KDP publicly had rejected Baghdad’s demand to cancel the 
outcome of the independence referendum in order to begin talks (“Baghdad: Iraqi forces,” 2017). The loss of 
Kirkuk resulted in the KRG losing more than half their oil production (L. Morris & DeYoung, 2017) hammer-
ing the nail in the coffin of their quest for economic independence from Baghdad-based oil-revenue.
Subsequent to the loss of Kirkuk, on October 23, 2017, Iraq’s media regulator, the Communication and 
Media Commission, decided to shut down Rudaw TV and Kurdistan 24, two Kurdish media based in Erbil 
(“Kurdistan Parliament: Decision,” 2017; Sulaivany, 2017). The International Federation of Journalists con-
demned the ban as a politically motivated crackdown on media and expresses concerns regarding the politici-
zation and lack of independence of the Communication and Media Commission (International Federation of 
Journalists, 2017). The ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to retake Kirkuk and other disputed territories with-
out facing noteworthy resistance and the Communication and Media Commission’s ban of two Kurdish media 
implied a shift in power between KRG and Baghdad post-referendum in favor of Baghdad. On October 25, 
KRG reached out to Baghdad, only a month after the vote, offering to freeze the results of the referendum for a 
promise from Iraq to halt its military activity, which had retaken huge swathes of previously Kurdish-held ter-
ritories taken from ISIS. The post-referendum conflict resulted in tens of thousands of Kurds being displaced 
and scores killed. Hashed al-Shaabi, who is part of the Popular Mobilization Force and has played a major role 
in the territorial advances against the Kurds, rejected the proposition to freeze the result believing this to cause 
yet another internal conflict in Iraq. However, it is important to keep in mind that the Popular Mobilization 
Force according to Amnesty International allegedly has looted, set on fire, and destroyed hundreds of proper-
ties in Kurdish areas (Ensor, 2017; “Iraqi Kurds offer,” 2017). On October 26, a day after the proposal to freeze 
the result, PM Al-Abadi rejected the KRG’s offer and declared that he would not accept anything short of a 
cancelation of the referendum. Ali al-Alaq elaborated on Al-Abadi’s rejection of the KRG’s offer that accept-
ing to freeze the result would create a “time-bomb” that the KRG “could throw at the government whenever it 
wishes” (“Iraq rejects Kurdish,” 2017, para. 9).
It is important to stress that the KRG has not declared independence despite the strong mandate from the 
voters to do so. The independence referendum created internal turmoil in the KRG and the talks between 
Baghdad and KRG were not advancing. In the aftermath of the referendum, both parliamentary and presi-
dential elections in the Kurdistan Region were set for November 1, 2017. However, on October 23, 2017, the 
Kurdistan’s Electoral Commission declared that due to the failure of political parties to present candidates and 
the latest development in the region, the elections would be postponed until Iraqi Kurdistan’s parliament fixed 
a new date for elections (Chmaytelli, 2017a). On October 24, the Parliament agreed to postpone the elections to 
2018 at a session that was boycotted by Gorran and the Kurdistan Islamic Union. Gorran, who had been criti-
cal of the referendum process, demanded Barzani’s resignation upon news of the postponement (Chmaytelli, 
2017b).
In late October, KRG was in a severe political crisis with critics of the postponement of the elections calling 
for the president’s resignation and the government’s failure to reach an agreement after the independence ref-
erendum had backfired. Responding to the crisis, Barzani announced on October 28, 2017, that he would step 
down as president. Barzani read out to the Kurdish Parliament:
After November 1st, I will no longer exercise my functions, and I reject any extension of my mandate…. I 
ask parliament to meet to fill the vacancy in power, to fulfil the mission and to assume the powers of the 
presidency of Kurdistan.
(“Iraqi Kurdish leader Barzani to step down,” 2017, para. 3, 5)
Following the parliament session, he went on national TV and said that the “three million votes for Kurdistan 
independence created history and cannot be erased,” and also accused rivals of committing “high treason” 
(“Iraqi Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani to step down,” 2017, para. 8, 9) for abandoning Kirkuk without a fight. 
The latter comment divided the Kurdish region more than it united it and added fuel to the KDP and PUK 
blame-game.
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Following Barzani’s call for parliament to fill his vacancy, the Iraqi Kurdish parliament passed a temporary 
law to distribute the president’s executive powers among the KRG’s prime minister, cabinet, parliament, and 
judiciary. The law made Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani (Masoud Barzani’s nephew) the chief executive 
authority and external representative of the KRG (Seckin, 2017). Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani has since 
sought to open dialogue with Baghdad saying: “We don’t think issues could be resolved militarily. They need 
serious political talk.” He has expressed that the KRG is ready to negotiate within the constitution and hand 
over its oil deposits to the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization if Baghdad is willing to pay the full “17%” of 
the federal budget. Nechirvan Barzani thus takes a much more relaxed and open approach towards Baghdad 
than his predecessor to resolve the political crisis. Nechirvan Barzani also ended his plea by calling for new 
talks with Iran and Turkey openly asking for their help to solve the KRG’s disputes with Iraq (“Barzani extends 
olive branch,” 2017).
Without a stable and formalized agreement for dialogue between KRG and Baghdad, the future for the Iraqi 
Kurds does not look bright. At the time of writing no such dialogue or negotiation was taking place. A deal 
could be essential for the Iraqi Kurds as Baghdad has taken control of key border control points and is about to 
gain control of the important border town of Fishkhabour, through which the KRG sends its oil to Turkey. If 
Baghdad gains control of the oil infrastructure in Fishkhabour, it could at any time shut down KRG’s oil export. 
This would significantly increase Baghdad’s leverage in future budget negotiations as the Iraqi Kurds would not 
be able to export oil independently and thus be forced to engage with Baghdad. Iraqi control of Fishkhabour 
would also hinder Turkey’s previous strategy of diversifying its energy support by being able to rely on KRG 
oil if the relationship with Iraq grew strained (Dubin, 2017). It seems that Turkey has prioritized its political 
energy security lower than ensuring the KRG did not call for independence.
Domestically, KRG’s Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani invited the previously sacked Gorran ministers to 
rejoin their positions within the KRG to ease the political crisis. Gorran’s spokesperson Shorsh Haji clearly 
rejected the invitation: “The KDP and PUK and the Kurdistan government have failed in a big way. Not only 
did they bring failure, but they also brought catastrophe on our nation” (“Gorran rejects PM,” 2017, para. 7). He 
added that Gorran demanded all of the KRG to resign and form an interim government to handle negotiations 
with Baghdad and prepare the 2018 elections. With their narrow majority of 56 out of the 111 parliament seats, 
PUK and KDP rejected this demand.
The independence referendum has had tremendous effects on the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and neighboring 
countries. Internally, it created a chaotic environment that postponed the presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions and divided the two dominant parties of KDP and PUK through their blame-game of who lost Kirkuk 
and its oilfields. Gorran as the leading opposition to the KDP-sponsored independence referendum was criti-
cal throughout the process, and its demand for the responsible politicians of the referendum to step down has 
been rejected by PUK and KDP. PUK and KDP managed to increase their seats at the 2018 election, despite the 
consequences of the referendum, as their extensive patronage networks and Peshmerga militias most likely was 
able to counter a successful electoral threat from Gorran (Seckin, 2017). Furthermore, Gorran’s refusal to form 
part of the new government under Massoud Barzani’s nephew, Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, left them in 
the cold to build a patronage network of their own. Even Massoud Barzani, a president who appeared to have a 
tight grip on the KRG, could not avoid his responsibility for the consequences of holding the referendum and 
had to resign. Amidst this, the KRG is caught up in an economic crisis and has lost more than half of the oil 
production it controlled before the referendum.
Externally, the Iraqi Kurds lost various operational alliances as a result of the referendum. Turkey, formerly 
their most important ally in the region, has shifted its weight behind Baghdad, and the US did not recognize the 
referendum. In the aftermath, Iranian-sponsored Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraqi Security Forces have 
retaken disputed areas and pushed further to take control of the Iraqi Kurdish oil infrastructure and key border 
towns. In the process, thousands of people have been internally displaced within the disputed areas. The Iraqi 
Kurdistan that has emerged from the aftermath of the referendum is a divided area having lost autonomy from 
Baghdad due to both internal and external factors.
CONCLUSION
Internal Kurdish Coherence
The two previous parts of this book have examined the alliances, capacities, and political objectives of Syr-
ian and Iraqi Kurdish groups respectively. In the following, the internal as well as transnational coherence 
among these groups is assessed. Finally, the conclusion discusses the likely policy implications of continued or 
enhanced support to these groups taking the levels of coherence among them into account.
Iraqi Kurdistan
The Iraqi Kurdish parties have almost since the dawn of their autonomy in the 1990s struggled to unify under a 
single government. The KDP and PUK fought a civil war in the 1990s over this issue. Their internal differences 
have led them to set up separate party-affiliated government institutions, as well as separate party-affiliated 
Peshmerga units. In 2006, both parties agreed to unify their separate governments, but several reports indicate 
this was never implemented. In the 2013 regional election, Kurdish citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan gave voice to 
their dissatisfaction with the ruling parties’ alleged corruption and nepotism through a landslide election that 
secured Gorran, a new party, a powerful electoral position. Gorran worked to unify the two administrations 
until its minister posts were removed by KDP loyal Peshmerga forces in 2015 due to disagreements over exten-
sion of Barzani’s presidential term. This political turmoil in KRG arguably fueled the polarization in a society 
with already low democratic institutional coherence. The failure of KDP and PUK to unify under a single 
regional government manifested itself in the form of the KRG’s initial setback in stopping ISIS’s advance into 
Kurdish territory. Furthermore, Masoud Barzani’s call for a non-binding independence referendum deepened 
the political crisis and brought the level of collaboration between Iraqi Kurdish political parties to the lowest 
level in the post-Saddam era. The referendum process was largely KDP-led and opposed by Gorran. PUK chose 
to support the referendum, as it was widely popular among the voters, but was skeptical of KDP’s intentions 
behind the timing of the referendum.
Our investigation found that the KRG at the time of the referendum had a dysfunctional parliament, a 
divided administration, a questionable democratic mandate for its president, severe restrictions on free speech 
and press freedom, disputed territories with Baghdad, economic problems, and strong international opposition 
to its move for independence. Although the Kurdish Region was facing these issues, 92% voted in favor of inde-
pendence. Despite the popular backing for KRG to negotiate independence with Baghdad, the aftermath of the 
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referendum brought forth the internal dysfunctionalities of the KRG politics as well as the distrust between 
PUK and KDP. The Iraqi Security Forces’ retaking of Kirkuk without substantial resistance from PUK’s Pesh-
merga forces ‘defending’ the city initiated a blame-game in which KDP accused PUK of betraying the region 
by collaborating with Baghdad and Iran. The KRG did not meet the Iraqi Security Forces’ advancements into 
the disputed areas taken from ISIS and was not able to unite in opposition to Baghdad post-referendum. The 
referendum’s backfiring for the Kurdish region resulted in President Barzani resigning from his post, leaving 
behind a political void, which has not been filled by the end of 2017. His nephew, Prime Minister Nechirvan 
Barzani, is now acting as head of state. Nechirvan Barzani sought to restart KDP’s relationship with Gorran by 
inviting them to take part in an interim government, which they declined.
By the end of 2017, the KRG is severely divided politically at a time when their autonomy is being challenged 
by Baghdad. After having seized the oil fields of Kirkuk, Iraq has been securing border-crossings to Turkey 
in an attempt to gain the ability to block the KRG from selling oil independently, firmly tipping the scale in 
Baghdad’s favor in future negotiations.
Northern Syria
In Northern Syria, the rivalry between PYD and KNC for political leadership of the Syrian Kurds has ended 
with PYD and its armed wing, YPG, in a strong and almost unchallenged position. An attempt was made to 
solve the initial rivalry by uniting the parties in a power-sharing agreement sponsored by then KRG President 
Barzani through the KSC. The agreement derailed due to several factors such as PYD’s rapid rise and military 
dominance through YPG as well as KNC’s internal issues and frequent splits. It was run into the ground when 
PYD unilaterally declared the three Syrian Kurdish cantons as autonomous regions under the name of Rojava. 
The regions were to be governed under the ideology of democratic autonomy by the TEV-DEM, a body heavily 
dominated by PYD. Since then, the Syrian Kurdish parties have sought their aims through separate strategies. 
The KNC lost its ground presence in Syria and tried to seek influence in Geneva at the various peace talks 
together with the parts of the Arab opposition that were represented, but no significant progress was achieved. 
In parallel, PYD continued to consolidate its political project in Northern Syria by expanding its territories 
near the Turkish borders in an effort to unite the cantons. PYD is executing this through a strategy that on 
paper includes Syria’s different ethnicities in militant and political groups such as SDF and SDC. On the sur-
face, the groups appear to have a multiethnic leadership, but when taking a closer view, the SDF and SDC are 
dominated politically by PYD and militarily by YPG.
The Syrian Kurdish groups can arguably be characterized as being completely under PYD control since the 
group has managed to gather other groups under its security umbrella of the YPG. Since the population is more 
ethnically heterogeneous in Northern Syria than in Iraqi Kurdistan, the strategy of inclusion was a necessity 
seen from a PYD point of view. PYD has addressed these challenges through a security driven approach by cre-
ating and setting up local councils representing the ethnicity from a conquered area rather than seeking central 
political control of these areas. The post-ISIS situation in Northern Syria will of course push different political 
agendas to the surface. How PYD will manage this situation remains to be seen.
Kurdish Transnational Coherence
Despite the Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish groups’ shared objective of fighting ISIS, there is not, as has been shown 
above, a uniform political front among these groups. They have different political goals that diverge sharply, 
despite their shared ethnicity, culture, and historical past. KRG promotes a business-friendly economic policy 
with a strong focus on foreign investment and a democratic system built upon electing representatives to a cen-
tral regional parliament (Kurdistan Regional Government, n.d.-b). The dominant Syrian Kurdish party, PYD, 
promotes an ideology based on the anti-capitalist ideology of PKK’s founder, Abdullah Öcalan, favoring direct 
democratic control and environmental sustainability in the economic sphere and a radical decentralization in 
the political realm. This illustrates that PYD and KRG have two very different approaches to organizing their 
society’s political and economic systems.
In October 2014, the two Kurdish entities united at Kobane, when Iraqi Peshmerga came to assist the  Syrian 
Kurds in the fight against ISIS. Since then, operational and strategic coordination has been low and both 
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 entities have focused on their own agendas in the fight against ISIS. This was particularly evident when YPG 
commanders refused the entry of Syrian-trained Peshmerga forces in Iraq under KNC command unless they 
were completely under YPG command. This move dwindled KDP’s influence in Syria after the power-sharing 
agreement brokered by Barzani had failed.
Two factors seem to play a dominant role in relation to the lack of coordination and lack of a joint Kurdish 
front in the fight against ISIS. First, rivalry for Kurdish leadership and disagreements on political and economic 
issues. Second, different external alignments. As argued above, the relationship between PKK and PYD is 
strong and PKK most likely played an important role in PYD’s rapid rise. Although PYD has gained from its 
relationship with PKK in many aspects, it came at the price of antagonizing Turkey, as the prospect of a PKK-
friendly entity controlling territory near its borders with Syria is a non-crossable redline for Ankara. As the 
conflict developed, so did Turkey’s opposition to PYD and SDF advances in Northern Syria. Turkey has taken 
many steps to halt Kurdish advances while a US-led coalition stepped up its collaboration with SDF despite 
outspoken Turkish concerns and attempts to create an alternative fighting force of Sunni Arab forces backed by 
the Turkish military to substitute SDF. This has left Turkey alone among its NATO allies in speaking about the 
alleged PYD-PKK affiliation. However, support in this manner arose when Barzani stated that PYD and PKK 
were the same, which did not help the Syrian Kurds’ fight against ISIS as it supported the Turkish discourse of 
limiting the support for PYD due to the linkage to PKK. As PKK is on the European and US terror list, a clear 
link between PKK and PYD would result in restrictions on Western cooperation with PYD, severely limiting 
the US-led coalition’s ability to support them.
Turkey’s foreign policy during the conflict shows just how differently Turkey views the Syrian and Iraqi 
Kurdish groups. According to Turkish foreign-policy thinking, PYD poses a threat and must be stopped while 
KRG largely has been treated as an important political and economic partner until it held the independence 
referendum. This could be interpreted as Turkey viewing the risk of Iraqi and Syrian Kurds beginning to coor-
dinate and cooperate on a unified Kurdistan as very low. Translated into this study’s context, it suggests that the 
transnational Kurdish coherence is low, which is further supported by the argument presented above on the 
different political ambitions among the different groups. Meanwhile tensions between Barzani and PKK in Iraq 
have also become increasingly problematic for KRG, as Turkey has taken a harsher stand on PYD and PKK. 
In the final phase of the fight against ISIS, Barzani urged PKK to withdraw from the Iraqi Kurdish territory 
peacefully, simultaneously with Turkey bombing PKK in the Iraqi Qandil Mountains again. Barzani feared the 
PKK presence could bring the Iraqi Kurds into the newly ignited conflict between Turkey and PKK (“Barzani 
asks PKK to quit,” 2015; Tol, 2012b; Zaman, 2016). Such a situation could have a negative impact on the much-
needed foreign investment to restart the economy in the Kurdistan Region. Furthermore, it would influence 
the security situation in the Kurdistan Region, which Barzani of course sought to avoid.
Looking at the Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish entities’ war against ISIS, it seems they are both pursuing their indi-
vidual political goals, which in many aspects do not align. To unify Rojava, PYD must advance further along 
Turkey’s borders at a time when tensions between PKK and Turkey are escalating into violence. KRG on the 
other hand saw an opportunity to strive for independence from Baghdad while having had control of the oil-
rich province of Kirkuk amidst Baghdad’s initial moderate fight against ISIS and later political instability. The 
war against ISIS in this regard appears to have illuminated the gap between the PKK and PYD on one side and 
the KRG on the other, and possibly widened it, instead of presenting an opportunity for the entities to unite 
politically against a common enemy.
The study’s findings therefore indicate that it could be problematic to treat the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds as a 
coherent political entity. Both are seeking very different political goals, illustrated by their different relation-
ships with Turkey. Despite the recent deterioration in the relationship between Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey, it 
is unlikely that neither part had interests in it turning hostile. Turkey has large economic investments in Iraqi 
Kurdistan and the KRG is opposed to PKK’s presence in the Qandil Mountains. Turkey and KRG thus have 
mutual goals that they both could achieve through collaboration. So far, Turkey has mainly threatened the 
KRG and begun to talk directly with Baghdad while ignoring KRG. Turkey has also held talks with Iran on 
how to stop any Kurdish attempt to secede. If the KRG and Turkey’s relationship normalize, both parties stand 
to obtain considerable security, economy, and energy gains from cooperation. However, their relationship may 
evolve. KRG’s bid for independence did set a strong precedence for any Kurdish entity seeking independence: 
Such a scenario is deemed too great a security risk for Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, and they will take harsh measures 
to stop it.
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The Iraqi and Syrian Kurds both struggle to adhere to core Western liberal values of free press, separation 
of powers, and freedom. However, the Iraqi Kurdistan’s democracy has been severely challenged by Barzani’s 
latest presidential term extension, the government’s abuses of power, profound corruption, and the lack of a 
free press. In Northern Syria, KNC (and also Human Rights Watch) amongst others have criticized the condi-
tions for the civilian population in Rojava and accused PYD of having committed human rights abuses against 
political opponents and for taking control of the central de-facto governmental and juridical positions. The 
same critique has been directed at the KRG. This underlines the major internal challenges within the Kurdish 
groups, which have started to surface in the post-ISIS reality in both Syria and Iraq. It remains to be seen if 
tensions have reached their peak.
This study’s purpose has been to examine the coherence among Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish entities through 
the available empirical data. The findings suggest that the operations the Kurdish entities have conducted in 
the war against ISIS almost align with their own political ambitions. The Iraqi Kurds were quick to take Kirkuk 
from Baghdad, but reluctant in freeing other Arab dominated cities or to cooperate with the Iraqi Army in a 
mutual stand against ISIS as was seen in Mosul. In Syria, the SDF have expanded their territories well beyond 
ISIS-held territories at times with the help of Russian bombings against groups represented in the Syrian oppo-
sition. Clashes between SDF and non-ISIS groups clearly suggest that SDF is pursuing the political objective of 
uniting Rojava and naturally seeks external support that promotes this objective. The US-led coalition’s coordi-
nation with the Kurdish entities in fighting ISIS is therefore most likely to be effective when their interest aligns 
with those of the coalition’s, namely to counter ISIS. However, it is important to keep in mind that top priorities 
among the coalition, the Syrian Kurds, and the Iraqi Kurds often differ.
Taking into account how the US and European countries abstained from supporting the Iraqi Kurdish bid 
for independence after the Iraqi Kurds having been allies in the fight against ISIS, it is very likely that the Syrian 
Kurds (PYD) watched very closely how this played out. Some Iraqi Kurds were reported as feeling betrayed by 
the US’s inability or hesitancy to stop the Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraqi Security Forces from re-taking 
Kirkuk and stopping the conflict from escalating. Lack of a clear strategy and explicit assurances can hurt the 
West’s credibility among Kurdish groups. The US should therefore take into consideration that PYD (SDF) 
might feel abandoned by the US in Syria (where the US’s presence is significantly weaker than in Iraq) after ISIS 
has been almost defeated. If such a scenario unfolds, and SDF-US relations turn bad, this could cause the SDF 
to look for other possible alliances and the US must therefore have a plan to swiftly regain the weaponry they 
delivered to SDF to ensure it will not be used against their NATO ally Turkey.11
A future Western policy to rebuild and reintegrate previous ISIS-held territories in Syria and Iraq, 
 especially Raqqa in Syria, should therefore not solely rest on the goodwill and declared war against ISIS by 
the Kurdish entities. Throughout this study, differences in the political goals of the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds 
have been identified. When formulating future strategies for stabilization in Syria and Iraq these differences 
should be taken into account to increase the sustainability of such efforts. Turkey’s continued role in the 
region must also be included in such a strategy, as Ankara’s concerns for the link between PKK and PYD 
and the threat this link poses to Turkey is not without reason. Continued or even expanded support to SDF 
might prove to be the best option on the table, but it is important to address the scenarios that such a strategy 
most likely will result in.
Furthermore, Iran’s latest active role in the region is visible through its influence on the Kurdish issue. The 
Kurdish issue has opened up for the formation of an operative alliance between Iran and Turkey to ensure their 
own territorial integrity as well as their influence in Iraq and Syria. Iran has also emerged as an actor with influ-
ence on the Iraqi Kurdish PUK Peshmerga, which was seen when the PUK Peshmerga stood down when the 
Iran-controlled Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraqi Security Forces retook Kirkuk. In Syria, Iran holds large 
influence over Assad after having been a vital factor in the regime’s survival. If Assad stays in power after the 
civil war, which at the time of writing seems very plausible, Iran (as well as Russia) is likely to have a significant 
say in how to deal with Rojava.
The Kurdish entities might serve as the only effective ground forces, plowing through ISIS-controlled areas 
and liberating the Syrian and Iraqi population, but as always caveats require consideration as multiple agendas 
 11 The US-Turkey relationship has in the recent years deteriorated further, which partly has its origins in conflicting interest regarding 
the war in Syria and its consequences as well as on support to the Syrian-Kurdish group PYD. Read more: (Sazak, 2018).
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are in play in both countries. In Syria, the PYD’s interest in realizing the political project of Rojava has illu-
minated a key priority in their operations of taking strategic towns between their cantons while staying out of 
Raqqa, which is not a Kurdish heartland. The SDC and SDF took a leading role in establishing the Raqqa Civil-
ian Council, which was announced in April 2017. In post-ISIS Raqqa, the Raqqa Civilian Council has become 
an important structure for stabilization efforts in the area and it has been supported by the US. However, the 
council has also been criticized by locals, who see it as a tool used by the Kurds to expand their authority over 
other ethnic groups – primarily Arab groups – that has a far stronger ethnic representation in Raqqa (Al-
Hussien, 2017).
In Iraq, the KRG’s corruption issues, economic problems, democratic deficit, and divided  administrations 
have yet to be properly addressed. After the referendum, the KRG has been more divided than ever amongst 
its political parties and has faced a hard backlash from Baghdad, who seems eager to limit Kurdish  autonomy 
and regional influence. The fight against ISIS forced to the surface deep internal problems within the KRG 
and Barzani’s independence referendum has led the KRG to experience a sharp decline in regional and 
 transnational Kurdish influence, economic power, oil reserves, and autonomy. Iran and Turkey have  managed 
to turn the aftermath of the KRG’s referendum into a clear warning to the Syrian, Iranian, and Turkish  Kurdish 
ambitions.
Expanded logistical support and continued arming of Kurdish entities to continue pressure on ISIS, could 
be a miscalculation and play into enhancing other looming conflicts if the different Kurdish agendas are not 
taken into consideration. If the legitimacy issues of the KRG and the accusations of repression of opposi-
tion and nepotism are not addressed, but disregarded because of the Kurdish fight against ISIS, new security 
problems are bound to emerge. These issues of legitimacy can only be addressed through a demanding 
internal reform agenda. International actors can support such a reform agenda by making demands when 
oil is purchased.
With regard to the intra-Kurdish balance of power, before ISIS emerged the KRG was militarily and econom-
ically superior to the Syrian Kurds, and furthermore enjoyed regional support and international legitimacy. 
However, as of 2017, PYD (SDF) has risen to become one of the strongest actors in the Syrian civil war despite 
various attempts by Turkey and the Arab opposition to diminish the group’s capabilities and influence. The 
evidence gathered throughout this investigation illustrates that Rojava is not suffering from the same internal 
political split as KRG because of its single-party government rule, exclusion of opposition, and ability to estab-
lish a united administration. However, it remains to be seen if the PYD is able to build a sustainable economy 
and inclusive society, if it is granted such autonomy by the Syrian government.
Turkey’s slow military advancements and reliance on Russian concession to operate within Syria reduces 
Turkey’s ability to dictate the terms and degree of autonomy the PYD (SDF) can achieve in Syria post-civil 
war. The US does not have the same ground presence within Syria as Assad, Russia, and Iran. Despite the fact 
that the US has provided a significant amount of weaponry to SDF, the advances of Assad and his allies could 
prompt PYD to seek concessions from international actors such as Russia and Iran rather than the US to obtain 
a degree of autonomy or achieve its stated goal of Syrian federalism.
In Syria, a Rojava as part of a federal Syria ruled by democratic autonomy could provoke actions from Turkey 
and be unwelcoming for Arab entities as well as Kurdish entities in opposition to the democratic and politi-
cal system that PYD/YPG promotes. Therefore, a rushed policy solely based on eliminating ISIS through the 
Kurdish entities could end up not stopping but prolonging the underlying conflicts in the war-torn region. The 
US will have to carefully manage its relationship with PYD as increased support for the group, could prolong 
the conflict. The US should therefore balance the support to the PYD with political demands in exchange for 
continued support, which could influence the group in a more sustainable political direction.
To conclude, this study has found that the internal coherence of the Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish entities is 
very low and that their relationship in the fight against ISIS has been more characterized by rivalry than 
alignment. Kurdish political parties and groups within Syria and Iraq are each pursuing nationally defined 
and divergent goals. The Syrian or Iraqi Kurdish entities show little if any willingness to overcome internal 
power struggles to maximize their fight against ISIS. What has erupted out of the war against ISIS is Syrian 
and Iraqi Kurdish entities that most likely will prioritize fulfilling their own policy goals. A strong transna-
tional Kurdish front with alliances between Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish entities is therefore highly unlikely to 
develop in the near future. A more probable scenario is continued rivalry internally and between Syrian and 
Iraqi Kurdish entities.
50 Internal Kurdish Coherence
Policy Implications
In order to provide readers and especially policy makers with key points in an overview format the  following 
extracts the six main policy implications from the conclusion that needs to be taken into consideration in 
future development of Western policies in Syria and Iraq.
•	 NATO’s engagement in the region, and thereby Denmark’s, should address the complex dilemma 
of relying on the effective Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish forces who have fought ISIS while at the same 
time hurting its relations with Turkey. NATO should develop a coherent strategy based on political 
priorities of whom to stand firmly behind.
•	 By arming Kurdish minorities in the fight against ISIS, the US and the West in general could risk 
threatening the national integrity of the regional states. However, by not supporting the Kurdish 
groups’ pursuit of their policy goals against regimes who have repressed them to different degrees, 
the West would abandon an ally it has armed and one that has been instrumental in the fight against 
ISIS. If this dilemma is not recognized at the highest political level and a coherent strategy is not 
developed, the US and supporting nations of Operation Inherent Resolve (which includes  Denmark) 
could risk losing both the trust and allegiance of all allies – namely Turkey, Iraq, PYD/YPG (SDF), 
and KRG.
•	 The study’s findings clearly stresses that it is problematic to treat the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds as a 
coherent political entity.
•	 A future Western policy to rebuild and reintegrate previous ISIS-held territories in Syria and Iraq, 
especially Raqqa in Syria, should not solely rest on the goodwill and declared war against ISIS by 
the Kurdish entities.
•	 Expanded logistical support and continued arming of Kurdish entities to act as boots on the ground 
can prove to be a miscalculation and play into enhancing other looming conflicts if the different 
Kurdish agendas are not taken into consideration.
•	 A future rushed policy solely based on eliminating immediate security threats through the Kurdish 
entities could end up not stopping but prolonging underlying conflicts in the war-torn region.
Epilogue
After finishing the manuscript of this book in early 2018, several major events occurred, one of them being the 
elimination of ISIS as a territorial movement in 2017 with the battle of Raqqa. This marked the final transition 
of the movement from a conventional state-aspiring movement to a classical terror group operating in the 
shadows and aiming its operations toward creating fear or support and not holding territory. However, ISIS as a 
group or a phenomenon is not gone as the group regularly claims responsibility for terror attacks in the region. 
In relation to the Kurdish internal coherence, this has indeed implied negative consequences, as the common 
enemy of almost all other actors is no longer present. US incitement to support SDF has therefore decreased, 
and the different Kurdish entities have naturally begun looking for other external support. At the same time, 
Turkey has seized the opportunity to secure its borders and even established safe zones within Syria, preventing 
Kurdish control of Afrin and the potential connection of Kurdish controlled areas in bordering Syrian territo-
ries to Turkey. By the end of 2018, the US is continuing its support of SDF as they clear out the last pockets of 
ISIS safe havens in Eastern Syria. However, there is underlying uncertainty about American commitment to 
SDF as Turkey continues to push for a change in US policy as the threat of ISIS diminishes. Meanwhile, Turkey 
and Bashar al-Assad threaten SDF with military action in Northern Syria. These challenges are most likely the 
reason behind SDF initiating talks with Bashar al-Assad in Damascus to work towards a democratic and decen-
tralized Syria. However, it remains unclear if these talks will be able to advance as the Assad regime previously 
has denied a decentralized Syria.
On the ground, reports indicate that SDF has begun establishing defense structures to deter attacks against 
its territory. This is most likely a way to raise the costs substantially of a possible military intervention in the 
region as an aggressor could find himself entangled in a fight with an insurgency of a Kurdish well-organized 
and armed ethnic group who are defending what has been defined as Kurdish core territory. Furthermore, after 
having experienced autonomy, the Syrian Kurds will most likely not give it up so easily, which would further 
increase their morale to defend it.
In Iraq, KRG-president Barzani’s initial political victory with the referendum on Kurdish independence in 
September 2017 illuminated the lack of international support to an independent Kurdish state. The lack of sup-
port from US and Europe proved to be particularly devastating for the Kurdish independence quest in the wake 
of the referendum. Furthermore, many of the issues in relation to internal coherence, corruption, and nepotism 
within KRG (as this book also addresses) became a focal point, culminating with the Iraqi move on Kirkuk 
where PUK-affiliated Peshmerga forces withdrew in spite of different orders from KDP president Barzani. This 
underlined the lack of not only political coherence within KRG but also lack of military coherence within the 
Peshmerga forces. The internal coherence between the two dominant Iraqi Kurdish parties of KDP and PUK is 
52 Internal Kurdish Coherence
decreasing as the threat of ISIS in Iraq has faded and Baghdad has limited KRG’s autonomy. If left unresolved, 
it could threaten the power-sharing agreement that is the foundation of the KRG governing institutions. Argu-
ably, this will wreak havoc, as there does not appear to be an alternative political system independent of the 
nepotistic party structures in place. Therefore, a change in the power relation between KDP and PUK can bring 
forth instability if one party seeks to challenge the other for dominance. Part of the increased tension can be 
explained by KDP eyeing weakness in a less coherent PUK after their leader and founder Jalal Talabani passed 
away last year and the party is struggling to unite behind a new leadership. On September 30 2018, the Iraqi 
Kurdistan held elections for its Parliament. Although the election was characterized by a low voter turnout and 
complaints of electoral fraud, KDP won most of the seats with 45 out of 111. PUK became the second largest 
party with 21 seats and Gorran third with 12 seats. The results continues to empower KDP as the party to lead 
the next regional government in KRG despite the region’s failing economy, increased isolation and high cor-
ruption.
Looking ahead, the Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish parties do not appear to be aspiring towards a transnational 
cooperation, although they all face increasing challenges with similar traits as their common enemy fades. The 
politics of the Kurdish political elites in Iraq and Syria focus on national issues, reflecting the low transnational 
coherence and reflects that the fight against ISIS did not promote coherence between the Iraqi and Syrian 
Kurdish political elites.
In a region and in countries where the only thing you can be somewhat sure of is that the sun will rise tomor-
row, further developments will without a doubt have outpaced the publication of this epilogue, as it has already 
done with the book. Nevertheless, we hope that reading this book has provided you with much more than a 
description of an ongoing security development in the era of ISIS. Rather, it is our hope that you have gained 
a comprehensive understanding of internal Kurdish coherence in Syria and Iraq that can be applied in future 
policy development as well as in future research and studies.
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The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) shocked the world when it entered the 
world stage in 2014. By seizing large territories in Syria and Iraq, its expansion 
within the Middle East seemed unrestrainable as the Iraqi Army fell apart and 
in Syria, various actors were caught up in a bloody civil war in the wake of the 
Arab spring. 
With US support, the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds became the main stand against ISIS 
acting as boots on the ground. The Kurdish success against ISIS in both Syria and 
Iraq quickly won them acclaim from the West and rendered them the key ally in 
the continued US-led effort against ISIS. In Western media and among Western 
decision makers, the Kurds as an entity are highly praised for their role in this 
fight. In addition, their fight for human rights, gender equality, secular rule, and 
democracy has also been highlighted as key features in assessing Kurds as a 
homogeneous entity that almost naturally shares strategic interest with the West.
This book, as it sets out to paint a more comprehensive picture of the different 
Kurdish groups in Syria and Iraq, concludes that these groups indeed have very 
different policy objectives and diverging regional partners of alliance thereby 
questioning the underlying assumption of a uniformed Kurdish entity. The 
book makes a significant contribution to a better understanding of the political 
goals, affiliations and rivalries of these important actors and Western allies in the 
Middle East. 
